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ii. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Royal, as Cross-Respondent with regard to this particular Brief would reiterate the 
Statement of the Case, Facts, and Procedural History as set forth in its original Appellants' Brief. 
Additionally, there are no significant disputes Royal would have with the Cross-Appellants' 
Statement of Facts and Procedural History. 
IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Royal would concur with the issues identified by the Cross-Appellant. Royal would also 
incorporate within the context of this Brief its issues as identified in the original Appellants' 
Brief previously filed with this Court. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Royal would agree with the representations of case law as identified in Cross-Appellants' 
Brief. Royal would also incorporate within its Brief the citations it put forth in its original 
Appellants' Brief. 
IV. ISIF'S ARGUMENTS AS TO DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 
While not expressly argued in the context of the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
(hereinafter ISIP) Opening Brief, there is mention of the possibility of violation of due process 
rights of!SIP based upon how this case has proceeded subsequent to Royal's complaint bringing 
ISIP into the action. Due process concerns were raised by ISIP to the Commission as part of the 
declaratory ruling process. The due process concerns were reiterated on the record at the 
hearing that occurred between Royal and ISIP, and there is slight mention of due process con-
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cerns at page 13 of ISIP' s Cross-Appellant Brief. Royal does not believe any of these concerns 
have any validity. 
As noted in Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged Fifth Edition, "due process of law" is 
defined as, " ... the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which 
pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property, in its most comprehensive 
sense; to be heard by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, 
every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved." With that 
definition, it is clear that ISIP has never truly had any due process concerns in this case. 
After the Complaint by Royal against ISIF was filed, a declaratory ruling process was 
initiated by ISIP wherein ISIP was given the opportunity to present its case to the Industrial 
Commission as to why the matter should not proceed forward. Briefing was submitted by ISIP. 
There apparently was oral argument presented (although current undersigned counsel was not 
representing Royal at that point in time and thus has no direct knowledge of what happened in 
those proceedings) and ultimately a decision was rendered by the Industrial Commission. 
(R., "Additional Documents", 7, Declaratory Ruling). 
As this Court is now well aware, litigation subsequently ensued between Royal and ISIF. 
During the course of that litigation ISIP was given the opportunity to depose Claimant - it elected 
not to do so. ISIP was given the opportunity to depose any of the physicians who had rendered 
opinions as to Claimant's employability status - it elected not to do so. ISIP had the opportunity 
to hire medical experts of its own choosing for evaluation of Claimant's physical capacities - it 
elected not to do so. ISIF had the opportunity to retain vocational expert opinions in an effort to 
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support its defenses - it elected not to do so. ISIF had the opportunity to depose Industrial 
Commission vocational consultants who had worked on the Claimant's case over the years - it 
elected not to do so, this deposition was taken by Royal. ISIF was given the opportunity to have 
a hearing and present its arguments before the Industrial Commission Referee. ISIF did take 
advantage of this process. As the Court is aware, the Industrial Commission ultimately found in 
ISIF' s favor. It is hard to imagine what due process rights were harmed during the course of this 
process. When a party wins in litigation it is presumed that they were allowed sufficient 
opportunity to put up enough evidence in their defense to have allowed the fact finder to actually 
find favorably for them. 
Accordingly, the procedural aspect that this case has followed does not present the 
slightest showing that there was any due process violations. Those arguments should be rejected 
by the Court. 
V. ISIF'S ARGUMENT AS TO THE DATE WHEN A CLAIMANTS 
DISABILITY STATUS SHOULD BE ANALYZED 
The long and the short of ISIF's argument in its Cross-Appellant's Brief is that the 
Industrial Commission was accurate in stating that the disability analysis for ISIF liability is 
determined by looking at the Claimant's status as of the date of the hearing in which ISIF 
participates. In this particular case, by the time the hearing occurred with ISIF the Claimant was 
70 years old. It is absolutely undisputed by any party in this matter that he severely lacks 
transferable skills to other types of employment than what he was engaged in immediately prior 
to this last industrial accident. Taking these two factors alone into consideration, ISIF argued 
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that as of the date of the hearing it participated in on July 18, 2006, Claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled. The Industrial Commission agreed with ISIF's position. In ISrF's Brief, 
it indicates that the time frame for analyzing the requirements to establish ISIF liability as 
established by this Court in the case ofDumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 
312 (1990), is the date of the hearing in which ISIF participates. In reading ISIF's Brief, no 
other conclusion can be reached. As this Court is aware, the requirements for ISIF liability set 
forth in Dumaw are the following: 
1) Whether there was indeed a pre-existing impairment; 
2) Whether that impairment was manifest; 
3) Whether the alleged impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and, 
4) Whether the alleged impairment in any way combines with the subsequent injury to 
cause total disability. 
Dumaw, idat 155. 
Under ISIF's analysis, evaluating the first three requirements as set fo1th by Dumaw are 
of no concern to us in the context of timing. Evaluating the existence and manifestation of a 
impairment that pre-existed the last industrial injury can be done whether one uses the date of the 
last industrial injury as the deciding "ISIF time liability factor"; whether one uses the date of 
medical stability from injuries incurred as a result of the last industrial accident; or, whether one 
uses the date of the hearing that ISIF participates in. The same can be said of evaluating 
"hindrance". 
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What is of concern is the fourth requirement set forth by Dumaw. That particular 
requirement indicates an analysis of looking at whether the pre-existing impairments combined 
with the subsequent injury to cause total disability. In other words, regardless of what date the 
parties actually stand before the Industrial Commission and mark their evidentiary record and 
present argument, the analysis as to ISIF liability is centered around the Claimant's status at the 
time of the last injurious industrial accident. There can be no other reading of Dumaw that 
makes any sense. 
The Industrial Commission has in numerous cases in the past found a Claimant to be 
totally and permanently disabled months, if not years, prior to the date of the hearing in which 
ISIF participated. The following is a very small sampling of some of these decisions that have 
come out of the Industrial Commission. While certainly not binding upon this Court as true legal 
precedence, it nonetheless shows us that ISIP' s arguments are ill-taken, and that in fact the 
Industrial Commission's method of handling this particular case not only runs afoul of how it has 
handled dozens of cases previously, but also opens a whole new can of worms in the workers' 
compensation arena - which will be discussed below. The following cases are representative of 
establishing the time frame for assessment ofISIF liability: 
I) Dursteler v. Basic American Foods. Inc. and ISIP, IC 99- 021419 (2006). (Attached 
hereto as Exhibit I). In this case, Claimant's last industrial accident occurred on March 31, 
1999. The hearing of the matter occurred on January 26, 2005. In addressing Idaho Code §72-
332, Payment for second injury's from Industrial Special Indemnity Account, the Referee 
noted that if an employee who had a permanent physical impairment incurred a subsequent 
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disability "by injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment and by reason of 
the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury suffers total 
and permanent disability" then disability shall be apportioned between the employer and ISIF. 
(See, Exhibit 1, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, p 18). In that 
paiiicular case, the Industrial Commission found that Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled as of the last industrial accident and that date was when ISIF liability attached. Date of 
ISIF liability was approximately 6 years prior to the date of the hearing in which ISIF 
participated. 
2) Wallingford v. City of Pocatello and ISIF, IC 2005 - 514661 (2007). (Attached hereto 
as Exhibit 2). This matter was heard before the Industrial Commission on November 22, 2006. 
In evaluating ISIF liability, the Referee addressed the requirements for ISIF liability established 
by Dumaw. With regard to the "combined with" element, the Referee stated then following at 
paragraph 49 of the decision: 
Finally, to satisfy the "combines" element, the test is whether but for the 
industrial injury, the worker would have been totally ai1d permanently disabled 
immediately following the occurrence of that injury. This test "encompasses 
both the combination scenario where each element contributes to the total 
disability, and the case where the subsequent injury accelerates and aggravates 
the pre-existing impairment." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 
129 Idaho 76, 81,921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). 
In using that analysis per the requirements of this Court, the Referee found Claimant to 
be totally and permanently disabled as of the date of medical stability from the injuries sustained 
in the industrial accident - this being November 17, 2005. As such, the date for attachment of 
ISIF' s liability was one year prior to the date of the hearing ISIF paiticipated in. 
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3) Quincy v. Quincy, 136 Idaho 1, 27 P.3d 410 (2001). In this particular case, which 
was decided by this Court, ISIF appealed an Industrial Commission decision apportioning 
liability to ISIF for injuries suffered by the Claimant, Rick Quincy. Hearing was held on June 9, 
1998. Claimant apparently suffered four industrial accidents- those occurring on April 23, 1991; 
January 2, 1992; August I, 1992; and, January 24, 1994. The accident of August 1, 1992 did not 
enter into the equation as to potential ISIF liability because there was no permanent impairment, 
and the last industrial accident in 1994 did not enter into the equation because the Industrial 
Commission found Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled as a result of the January 2, 
1992 industrial accident. Specifically, the Referee indicated that it was the 1992 back injury 
which rendered Claimant totally and permanently disabled. While the Referee did not find 
Claimant was disabled as of the date of that back injury, there was a finding that the date of total 
and permanent disability occurred on April 14, 1992 which was one day after Claimant was 
determined to be medically stable from that back injury. 
In the Quincy case, this Court analyzed the Industrial Commission's decision as to what 
constituted pre-existing impairments. This Court noted that the Industrial Commission properly 
established the cutoff date for determining pre-existing impairments (for potential ISIF 
apportionment) as not only needing to meet the requirement of being in existence prior to a 
subsequent industrial injury, but also medically stable prior to the industrial injury. While not 
specifically addressing the issue currently pending before the Court, it nonetheless shows that 
once again we find the analysis focuses on the date of industrial accident ( or medical stability 
from injuries sustained in that accident) for establishing the time period upon which one 
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evaluates potential ISIP liability. In the Quincy case, this Court affirmed the conclusions and 
opinion of the Industrial Commission which established employer and ISIP liability for 
Claimant's total and permanent disability. Like the Industrial Commission cases cited above, 
Quincy was a situation where the hearing occurred six years after the date Claimant was found to 
be unable to obtain gainful employment in the open labor market due to the combined effects of 
the pre-existing impairments and the last industrial injury. There was no argument made 
whatsoever that the standards for applying the Dumaw test requirements is the Claimant's status 
as of the date ISIP actually stands before the Industrial Commission and presents its case. 
4) Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indeminty Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 921 P.2d 1200 
(1996). In this particular case, this Court was asked to review an Industrial Commission decision 
which found ISIP not liable for benefits to the Claimant. At issue was whether the Claimant 
suffered from pre-existing conditions which combined with injuries from a 1991 industrial 
accident to render her totally and permanently disabled. The hearing was held on May 19, 1994. 
The Industrial Commission eventually ruled that ISIP was not liable insomuch as the pre-existing 
impairment alone resulted in Claimant's total disability even though she was gainfully employed 
and suffered a subsequent industrial injury. 
As noted by this Court in Bybee, this particular case presented a different situation than 
the standard "combined with" cases, or even the previous decision that had come out from this 
Court in the Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 173 (1989) case wherein ISIP 
argued that it had no liability because Claimant's industrial injury rendered her totally disabled 
by itself. This Court noted from the Industrial Commission's decision in Bybee, that ISIP had 
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argued that the "but for" test must "work both ways". With regard to the importance of Bybee to 
the present action, the following quotation from this Court's opinion is instructive: 
The Commission did not base its determination on any finding that Bybee would 
eventually become totally permanently disabled by operation of the pre-existing 
impairments, but on the finding that she was, at the time of the injuries, already 
an odd-lot worker. Moreover, given the requirement in §72-332(1) that the pre-
existing impairment and subsequent injury combine to result in total disability, it 
is implicit in the Garcia test that the relevant point in time is the point at which 
the iniury occurs. Stated more specifically, the test is whether, but for the 
industrial injury, the worker would have been totally and permanently disabled 
immediately following the occurrence of the injury. This statement of the rule 
encompasses both the combination scenario where each element contributes to 
the total disability, and the case where the subsequent injury accelerates and 
aggravates the pre-existing impairment. 
Bybee, id at 80-81 ( emphasis added) 
The cases cited above are simply a small representation of decisions that have come out 
of the Industrial Commission regarding ISIF liability, and also decisions from this Court 
regarding ISIF liability. Nonetheless, these decisions all point to the use of one central tenant in 
the context of determining ISIF liability - that being an analysis of Claimant's disability status as 
of the date of the last industrial accident. ISIF has used that particular date as a shield to escape 
liability in the types of cases where it asserts Claimant was totally and permanently disabled 
from pre-existing conditions before the last industrial accident, yet was employed simply due to 
super-human effort or the sympathy of a particular employer. ISIF has used the date of the 
accident as a sword to escape liability in cases where it asserts that the industrial accident itself 
was so severe that it alone caused Claimant to be totally and permanently disabled. ISIF has 
used the date of the accident in what we might call the "standard" total permanent case where its 
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defense is that there were either no permanent impairments manifest before the last industrial 
accident, or that the prior impairments were not a hindrance to Claimant's employability 
predating the last industrial accident. In each of these scenarios, the operative point of analysis 
is the date of the industrial accident. This is the point in time of reference established by Idaho 
Code §72-332. 
Aside from the fact that the statutory reference point is the analysis of pre-existing 
components with the last industrial accident, and aside from the fact that the case law clearly 
presents the last industrial accident as the point of reference, common sense tells us that such a 
date makes the best point for analyzing the case. The cases that diverge from this point of 
reference are those where the injuries sustained in the last industrial accident are such that the 
Claimant's employability status cannot be determined until medical stability from injuries 
received in the industrial accident is reached. Obviously, that would be at a date later than the 
last industrial accident. It could be several weeks, it could be several months, it could be several 
years. Even in those instances, however, there is no inference anywhere in any decision from 
either the Industrial Commission, or this Court, that can be found which would suggest that 
somehow the date of hearing before the Industrial Commission is the operative time frame for 
analyzing when a parties' liability attaches. Using the date of presentation of evidence to the 
Industrial Commission by ISIF is of even more concern as a reference point insomuch as the 
nature of Industrial Commission hearings is such that the date of reference can be put out even 
further. As this Court may be aware, Industrial Commission hearings consist of a specific cate 
that the parties appear in front of the Industrial Commission Referee. Subsequent to that date the 
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parties present additional evidence by way of expert deposition testimony that is also in the 
evidentiary record. In other words, the hearing is essentially "continued" for the presentation of 
expert witness testimony. Sometimes this can take upwards of six months. Accordingly, the 
practice of using the date of presentation of evidence could span a time period of four to six 
months. Does ISIF at some point in time now get to make an argument that the date for 
analyzing when their liability attaches might be the date of the taking of an expert vocational 
witness's deposition some four to five months post-hearing? Once again, the problems 
associated by the Industrial Commission's action in this case have spawned multiple 
permutations of questions and problems with application of potential benefits to a Claimant. The 
reason why is it just does not make any sense. 
As this Court is very well aware from having reviewed Industrial Commission cases for 
many years, it is not unusual for the litigation process to be so drawn out that a Claimant does 
not get his hearing before the Industrial Commission until years after an accident has occurred. 
The aforementioned case of Dursteler v. Basic American Foods is a good example of this. The 
industrial accident occurred in 1997 and the hearing before the Industrial Commission occurred 
in 2005. That is 8 years. That case is not unusual in its time parameters. If ISIF's position that 
their liability is analyzed, assessed and attaches as of the date that they stand before an Industrial 
Commission Referee to plead their case, then such a new interpretation of the law for Second 
Injury Fund liability is going to be extremely detrimental to the workers of this State. 
If ISIF can stand in front of the Industrial Commission and state that it has no liability 
because as of the date of the hearing the Claimant is of an advanced age and too old to 
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participate in the labor economy; yet at the time of the accident the Claimant was 8-10 years 
younger and clearly of an age where he or she would have been employable (absent their various 
physical conditions), then think of how many Claimants are going to be prevented from 
obtaining benefits from ISIF even if the injuries that resulted from the industrial accident have 
truly and unquestionably taken them entirely out of the employment market years prior. 
Royal would pose the question to this Court of what such a defense on the part of ISIF 
will do in situations where we have a worker who is already reaching an advanced age yet 
suffers an injury in an industrial accident that is accepted by the employer/surety, yet faces a 3-4 
year period of time before deemed medically stable. We know that the statute of limitations for 
making claim for disability under such a case where benefits have paid out is 5 years pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-706(2). However, if!SIF's position becomes the new "rule", then is it allowed 
to escape all liability on a case that may be crystal clear in regard to the Claimant being totally 
and permanently disabled, and also crystal clear as to ISIF liability if the date of accident is used 
- yet the Claimant needs to wait almost the full extent of the five year statute of limitations to 
bring forward the case against ISIF? The reality is that our workers' compensation statutes give 
Claimants five years to bring claims for disability benefits against the employer. During that 
time, they are aging. It seems to make little sense that a Claimant would be within his statutory 
rights to wait close to five years to file a complaint against the employer and ISIF for disability 
benefits, yet then be faced with the potential of having to face a ISIF denial that there is no 
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Second Injury Fund liability because of the advancement of age that has occurred in that time 
. d I per10. 
ISIF in its Brief indicates that the statutory scheme under Title 72 supports their position 
that ISIF liability should be established as of the date of the hearing. At page 22 of the Brief 
ISIF states that the purposes of the workers' compensation system are served by judging the 
Claimant's disability status at the time of the date of hearing where ISIF liability is to be 
determined. If such were the case, then as an example let us look at the aforementioned case of 
Dursteler. Mr. Dursteler would either have not gotten any benefits from ISIF whatsoever, or he 
would have been faced with the rather interesting situation of being taken out of employment in 
1997, go to hearing in 2005, be found totally and permanently disabled, yet not get any benefits 
of any kind for that 8 year period of time because the Commission would have been required to 
look at the date of the hearing as to when ISIF liability potentially attached - not as of the real 
date he was forced to stop working due to industrial injuries. This just does not make any sense. 
With regard to ISIF's position that only at the time of the hearing can the Industrial 
Commission truly judge whether the "but for" test has been met, such a position clearly runs 
contrary to the statutory provisions of Idaho Code §72-332. While it is true that the hearing is 
the place to bring forth all the evidence, that is not the date that the "but for" test revolves 
around. Once again, it is nonsensical. The "but for" test revolves around the date of the last 
1 Royal is aware that this Court has not indicated that there is a statute of limitations applicable as against ISIF. For 
purposes of this particular argument, Royal is only discussing the impact of those cases where the Claimant brings 
the claim for further benefits within the time limitations of Idaho Code Section 72-706, this to make the conceptual 
analysis "cleaner". Nonetheless, the same analysis would apply to those cases where a Claimant has previously 
brought claim against the employer and within the five years and settled out, yet then subsequently decides to seek 
remedy against ISIF outside the time parameters of Idaho Code Section 72-706. Such a procedural situation raises 
other issues which do not necessarily have any place in the current appeal. 
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industrial accident. It is debatable that is the time parameter Idaho Code §72-332 uses. We 
cannot use the date of the hearing to apply the "but for" test for no other reason than that nothing 
has happened to the Claimant on that date. The date of hearing is an arbitrary date established 
based upon the convenience of the calendars of the Referee who is hearing the case and the 
attorneys who are defending the various entities. 
To subject a Claimant's disability benefits, and the employer's potential to obtain 
contribution from the Second Injury Fund, to the nebulous date of when a hearing occurs before 
the Industrial Commission is not supported in any way by statutory provisions, let alone the 
pronouncements set forth in Idaho Code §72-332. An example is the following. What is the 
situation if we have a Claimant who has a hearing before the Industrial Commission scheduled 
five months before he is old enough to obtain full Social Security retirement benefits? The 
hearing gets vacated because one of the attorneys has a conflict on his calendar with a District 
Court case. The hearing gets rescheduled 8 months down the road. In the interim time the 
Claimant has retired, has collected Social Security retirement benefits, and is now in a situation 
where he could be considered "old" such that he is unemployable in the labor market.2 When the 
injuries sustained in an industrial accident which may have occurred a nwnber of years prior are 
thrown into this equation, and the Claimant ultimately goes to hearing, what can be the result 
under this scenario? The result could be that because the Claimant was not quite old enough to 
2 We must remember that just because the [ndustrial Commission found Mr. Stoddard to be "old" at age 70 such 
that he was unemployable by age alone, that age is not the definitive age at which ISIF arguments can be made. 
What prevents ISIF from making the argument that 67 is the appropriate age, or 65 is the appropriate age because a 
worker obtains Social Security retirement benefits? That is the root of the evil of this analysis brought forth by ISIP 
and adopted by the Industrial Commission. 
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get Social Security retirement benefits at the time of the first scheduled hearing that he would not 
have been found to be disabled from age alone and ISIF's defense would fail. However, due to 
the vagaries of administrative scheduling, the same individual would now be put into a situation 
where there would be sufficient evidence out there for ISIF to make an argument that Claimant 
was disabled by age alone - Social Security retirement benefits being exhibit 1 in that regard. 
Royal contends that all of this makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. 
The reality is that the Industrial Commission and this Court have never attached ISIF 
liability to the date that the hearing occurs for good reason. Reason number one is that Idaho 
Code §72-332 clearly tells us that a different time analysis of ISIF liability is to be used. The 
legislature has told us that date is the date of the last industrial accident. 
Another reason why the date of the hearing is not used is because of the absolute total 
uncertainty that would throw into our workers' compensation process. A Claimant would have 
absolutely no idea whether they should bring ISIF into an action or not. Not knowing how long 
it might take to get the case heard, the Claimant might be better off simply going after the 
employer and foregoing ISIF on the chance that the employer could be found liable for total 
permanent disability as of the date of the accident. Claimant might expend large sums of money 
and many years chasing ISIF only to find out that ISIF is not liable because the Claimant is "old" 
at the date of some subsequently occurring hearing. The Claimant may not know whether they 
should settle out with an employer on their claim and then litigate against ISIF for their 
proportionate share of total permanent disability. Once again, if the effective date is not the date 
of the accident ( or medical stability from injuries sustained in the industrial accident), then the 
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vagaries of litigation could mean ISIF could escape liability in its entirety, and the Claimant 
might have ended up settling out too cheaply with the employer premised upon some analysis of 
substantial ISIF liability if that analysis revolves around the date of the accident. The 
permutations are almost endless in causing untold uncertainty in this situation if we let this 
particular decision stand. 
VI. APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND/OR RES JUDICATA 
ISIF in its Cross-Appellant Brief mentions the legal concept of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata. Those are two separate and distinct legal theories. It is believed they need to be 
discussed separately. 
The applicability of resjudicata can be taken care of summarily. 
This Court has indicated that there is a distinct difference between the two concepts. 
Specifically, it is noted that the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is that the 
former may not apply unless both individuals were parties to a previous judgment, while the 
latter may be used defensively against a party to the original proceeding when the original party 
litigated the relevant issue in the prior action. Shea v. Bader, !02 Idaho 697, 699, 683 P.2d 894, 
896 (1981). In this particular case, Royal was the original party in the prior litigation; ISIF was 
not a part of that litigation. Resjudicata does not apply. 
As regards collateral estoppel, Royal, for purposes of brevity of briefing submitted to this 
Court, would reference the pronouncements of the Industrial Commission from the declaratory 
ruling as filed on August 27, 2003. At pages 5-9 of the declaratory ruling, the Industrial 
Commission went through a step-by-step analysis, with legal citation, as to why Royal's claim 
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against ISIF was not barred. Royal certainly agrees with the Industrial Commission's analysis. 
Royal would incorporate that analysis within its objection to ISIF's position. ISIF has included 
the Industrial Commission's Declaratory Ruling as Exhibit G to its Cross-Appellant's Brief. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of collateral estoppel does bear some comment. In reviewing 
ISIF's Brief. it is clear they take the position that there is no difference between the standards of 
what must be proven in determining disability between an employer/surety and the Claimant, as 
opposed to the standards for assessing liability against ISIF. In fact, ISIF goes so far as to asse1t 
that the entirety of all of the Dumaw requirements for ISIF liability as set forth by this Court 
were actually litigated at the first hearing. That is an interesting argument. It is interesting 
because in its Appellant's Brief at pages 12-13, ISIF makes the argument that the "combined 
effects" test was actually litigated amongst the parties and decided by the Industrial Commission 
in coming to the conclusion that Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the 
last industrial accident. This is interesting because that particular statement is clearly at odds 
with what ISIF' s position has been all along in this matter - that the "combined effects" test was 
never successfully proven by these Defendants, and that the date for disability was not the date 
of the last industrial accident (as previously found by the Industrial Commission), but instead 
was the date of the hearing in which ISIF participated. These thoughts are inconsistent. The 
reality is that the "combined effects" test never was litigated. While disability and 
apportionment to pre-existing conditions certainly were litigated, the entirety of the requirements 
for establishing ISIF liability under §72-332 were not part of that initial litigation. 
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This Court has stated in the past that while a pre-existing permanent physical impairment 
must constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or re-employment in order to be 
apportionable to ISIP as provided for under Idaho Code §72-332, it need not be a hindrance or 
obstacle to obtain employment or re-employment to constitute an apportionable pre-existing 
physical impairment in cases involving less than total disability. Campbell v. Key Mill work & 
Cabinet Co., 116 Idaho 609, 778 P.2d 731 (1989). The reason why Campbell is important in tbis 
action is that in the first hearing Royal was disputing that Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled. Royal's position was that apportionment for pre-existing conditions pursuant to Idaho 
Code §72-406 was appropriate. (See, Notice of Hearing, Exhibit A to Cross-Appellants' 
Opening Brief). That was the manner in which the case was litigated below. The unfortunate 
part, from Royal's perspective, was that the Claimant was ultimately found to be totally and 
permanently disabled. As accurately identified by ISIP in its Brief, this caused the Industrial 
Commission a great deal of consternation because of the clear existence of pre-existing 
permanent impairments that were argued by Royal to not be their responsibility, yet in the end 
had to be apportioned somewhere in the context of the finding of total and permanent disability 
absent a situation where apportionment could have ostensibly have been apportioned off to ISIP. 
Nonetheless, the reality is that the requirements for litigating "hindrance" and "combined 
effects" would not have been a part of the underlying litigation because those particular concepts 
are unique to ISIP involvement alone. Royal believes that the Industrial Commission's decision 
in its Declaratory Ruling is accurate in that regard. 
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Furthermore, this Court held in the case of Curtis v. Shoshone County Sheriffs Office, 
l 02 Idaho 300, 629 P.2d 696 (1981), that since the statutory definitions of "permanent physical 
impairment" under Idaho Code §72-332 and "permanent disability" under §72-422 and 423 were 
originally enacted simultaneously by the legislature, it was concluded that the legislature 
intended that they define three different, but related, classifications. Thus, we know from this 
Court's prior pronouncements that the concept of establishing ISIF liability is a distinct and 
different concept from the establishment of permanent impairment/permanent disability in the 
context of a case not having ISIF involvement. 
ISIF argues the case of Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, l 29 Idaho 689, 
931 P.2d 1207 (1997) in both its Brief to this Court and also in the briefing it submitted to the 
Industrial Commission as part of the Declaratory Ruling process. ISIF likes to raise the Jackman 
case in proceedings in an attempt to expand the parameters of how the concept of collateral 
estoppel will allow them to escape their proportionate liability in total permanent cases. 
However, it is interesting to note that this Court in Jackman, while not making a specific 
pronouncement on the current issue, did make a statement that is interesting in the context of the 
issue currently facing the Court in this action. Specifically, in addressing the collateral estoppel 
issue, the Court stated that "While Jackman has not had an opportunity to litigate the issue of 
apportionment pursuant to LC. §72-332, Jackman has failed to present additional allegations of a 
pre-existing permanent physical impairment, above the 33% impairment rating relied upon in the 
agreement." id at 692. ISIF neglects to cite this particular statement out of the decision 
insomuch as it is clear this Court found that there were two separate and distinct "proceedings". 
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First was the lump sum agreement that was entered into between Jackman and the State 
Insurance Fund. In that Agreement a specific impairment was identified. When the matter went 
to the Industrial Commission for hearing against ISIF, the latter raised the issue of collateral 
estoppel based upon the prior lump sum agreement. In Jackman this Court did not decide that it 
was error for the second hearing to have occurred in the first place. What the Court decided was 
the following: 
Jackman has failed to present additional allegations of a pre-existing permanent 
physical impairment, above the 33% impairment rating relied upon in the 
agreement. Jackman cam10t rely upon the same percentage impairment rating in 
order to attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present additional 
evidence of impairment in order to increase his impairment rating. The issue 
presented in the proceeding against SIF and SHS, compensating Jaclanan for his 
impairment rating of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman 
presently raises: whether ISIF must compensate Jaclanan for a portion of the 
same 33% whole person impairment. 
supra at 692. 
That factual scenario is entirely different than what we have in the present case. What 
the parties are litigating in the current action is not apportionment of prior impairment; it is not 
past benefits before the finding of total permanency. It is the prop01iionate responsibility 
between ISIF and Royal for future benefits for the remainder of Mr. Stoddard's life. 
VII. APPLICABILITY OF LC. §72-718 
ISIF asserts that this issue was essentially ignored by the Industrial Commission and 
Royal. Royal disagrees. The Industrial Commission at page 10 of its Declaratory Ruling 
identified the exact case on point as previously released from this Court which addressed this 
particular issue. Specifically, the Industrial Commission discussed the case of Tagg v. State, 
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Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (l 993). In reviewing that case, 
this Court indicated that an analysis of Idaho Code §72-718 "operates to make Industrial 
Commission decisions final and conclusive only as to matters actually considered and 
adjudicated by the Commission." id at 98. In the present case, it is undisputed that the initial 
order from the first hearing did not include any specific findings as to Idaho Code §72-332 and 
the Dumaw requirements for ISIF liability. Argument ofISIF in this regard is ill-tal<en. 
VIII. WAIVER 
ISIF asse1ts that at the first hearing Royal voluntarily and intentionally waived any 
opportunities it had to seek contribution from ISIF. As noted in prior portions of this Brief, this 
Court has not found in the past that those types of procedural situations when they have a.risen, 
preclude a subsequent action against ISIF. Clearly, there is no distinct statute of limitations that 
is directly identified with regard to ISIF claims. Thus, in a pure technical sense, Royal ca1mot 
have waived its claims against ISIF because there is no specific time frame established within 
which it must bring forth such a claim. In the case of Waltman v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 
109 Idaho 273, 707 P.2d 384 (1985), this Court did address to some degree, that particular 
situation. In Waltman the Court came to the conclusion that since the Claimant had made viable 
claim against the employer within the five year statute of limitations provision under Idaho Code 
§72-706, that any subsequent actions against ISIF ( even if brought outside the five year 
limitation period) would be viable. It is also interesting to note that another aspect of Waltman is 
applicable to this particular case. In Waltman there apparently were two separate proceedings at 
the Industrial Commission level one being a proceeding by the Claimant directly against the 
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employer and surety for additional compensation benefits. It appears that a second hearing 
occurred at a later date against ISIF alone - wherein Claimant asserted ISIF contribution. 
Neither the Industrial Commission nor this Court expressed any concerns with that type of 
procedural process. Royal would ask the rhetorical question of why there would be any 
difference in such a situation between a Claimant seeking contribution from ISIF as opposed to 
an employer/surety seeking contribution? The answer is there is no difference. Idaho Code §72-
332 does not put any restrictions upon the identity of the party that might bring an action seeking 
contribution from ISIF under that statutory scheme. 
Royal has submitted as Exhibit 3 a Supplemental Order of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission in the case of Klimes v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, I.C. 90-
700056 (l 994 ). Once again, Royal fully understands that this particular decision is not binding 
in any way upon this Court, but nonetheless the Industrial Commission's discussion and 
pronouncements in that Supplemental Order are applicable to the present situation and the claims 
of waiver. Royal believes the general gist of this particular pronouncement from the Industrial 
Commission supports its position that in the context of workers' compensation litigation there 
can be two separate sets of litigation. The first litigation can occur between a Claimant and the 
employer/surety. The second litigation can occur when the Claimant, or the employer/surety, 
brings forth an action for apportionment and entitlement to benefits payable by ISIF. Royal 
believes that the Industrial Commission accurately analyzed this situation in the Klimes Order. 
Royal does not wish to add to the length of this Brief by simply reiterating what the Industrial 
Commission has set forth in that particular Order. 
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Lastly, Royal has attached as Exhibit 4 the Industrial Commission decision from the case 
of Tagg v. State ofidaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, LC. 86-539901 (1991). As noted 
in a previous section of this Brief, this case went up to the Idaho Supreme Court with the 
decision identified as Tagg v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95 (1993). Of 
interest in the Industrial Commission's underlying decision is the discussion of the defense of 
!aches as raised by ISIF in that case. At Section 3 of the Findings of Fact, the Industrial 
Commission indicated that the doctrine of !aches arises out of equity. The same can be said with 
the doctrine of "waiver". The Industrial Commission accurately noted that by asserting the 
!aches defense, ISIP was in effect asking the Industrial Commission to establish a new statute of 
limitations by implementing this particular defense. The Industrial Commission discussed the 
problems with such a proposal, ultimately indicating that to adopt ISIF' s position would be 
contrary to the purpose of the workers' compensation law and the statutory establishment of 
ISIF. Royal asse1is that the same concept applies in this case with regard to ISIF's assertion of 
the doctrine of waiver. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reject ISIF' s assertions 
in that regard. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The first sentence of the conclusion in ISIF' s Cross-Appellant's Brief is, in reality, what 
causes the most consternation in this particular case. It was the Industrial Commission's finding 
that Mr. Stoddard was totally and permanently disabled as of the date of the industrial accident 
in question. Admittedly, this finding came about in the context of the hearing between Royal 
and Mr. Stoddard. Nonetheless, that is the date that the Industrial Commission determined him 
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to be totally and permanently disabled from any and all employment for the rest of this life. 
Incredibly, the Industrial Commission ignored this particular finding in the context of its 
analysis with regard to ISIP liability. Instead, it picked a date some 7 years later to establish 
whether ISIP liability attached in this particular case. Neither ISIP nor Royal disputed that Mr. 
Stoddard had remained totally and permanently disabled since the date of the industrial accident 
in 1999. 
With the Industrial Commission's decision as written, what do we do with that 7 year 
period of time? Claimant suddenly did not become less than totally and permanently disabled 
simply because there was a second hearing going on between the employer and ISIP. Certainly, 
there was no finding of such from the Industrial Commission. It might have been a different 
story if the Industrial Commission found 1bat the "combined with" test was not met when we 
examined the effects of Claimant's pre-existing impairments with his industrial injury. That was 
not the case. Instead, the Industrial Commission came up with the creative, but erroneous, 
standard of establishing that ISIP liability is only assessed as of the date of the hearing that 
occurs. Royal has explained why this particular finding should be found erroneous as a matter of 
law, and also why it simply does not make any sense in the context of how workers' 
compensation cases proceed through the litigation process. 
The Industrial Commission at page 4 of its Declaratory Ruling indicated that, "The ISIP 
is funded by a levy, pursuant to Idaho Code §72-327 in which all Idaho self-insured employers 
and sureties must pay a proportionate share of the indemnity paid on Idaho workers' 
compensation claims during the applicable reporting period." The monies that go into ISIP to 
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support payment of benefits to Claimant come from insurance companies like Royal. They do 
not come from the taxpayers. Those monies are supposed to be used to provide an injured 
worker lifetime benefits. As noted by the Industrial Commission at this section of their 
Declaratory Ruling, the ISIF was established to relieve an employer of the burden of being 
subjected to this lifetime disability when the situation involved one of an employee being 
rendered totally and permanently disabled because of a pre-existing condition coupled with a 
subsequent injury. That is exactly what we have in this case. ISIF should be liable for a portion 
of benefits to Mr. Stoddard. 
If we look to fairness in this litigation process, no one can objectively state that this case 
is one where ISIF should not have any liability. ISIF has made a creative argument about their 
liability attaching as of the date of the hearing. There have been issues raised about waiver, 
collateral estoppel, etc. Royal has addressed all these in their briefing. The bottom line is ISIF 
should be responsible for benefits paid to Mr. Stoddard. It is believed that evidence is in the 
record for this court to find so. Royal does not believe remand is required. The minimal 
evidence in the case showed that 60% of Mr. Stoddard's disability pre-existed the last industrial 
accident. It is respectfully submitted by Royal that this court has sufficient evidence not to 
remand for further findings, but instead to over-rule the Industrial Commission's finding and 
make a new finding that the disability of Mr. Stoddard be shared by Royal and ISIF. That ISIF's 
responsibility is 60% and Royal's responsibility is 40%. That calculations be made consistent 
with these numbers to assess ISIF proportionate responsibility, and that any overpayments Royal 
has made in paying disability benefits to Mr. Stoddard during the pendency of this litigation be 
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credited back to Royal. This is exactly what Royal requested in its original post-hearing Brief 
submitted with the Industrial Commission and as identified in the Industrial Commission's 
Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendation, page 2. 
DATED this \ \J day of March, 2008. 
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P. 
ERIC S. BAILEY - of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appell nts/Cross-
Respondents 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
FILED 
APR 2 5 2006 
INOUSTRIAL. COMMISSION 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-
entitled matter to Referee Rinda Just, who conducted a hearing in Idaho Falls, Idaho, on January 
26, 2005. Paul T. Curtis of Idaho Falls represented Claimant. Eric S. Bailey of Boise 
represented Employer/Surety (BAF). Paul B. Rippel of Idaho Falis represented the State of 
Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fuud (ISIF). The parties submitted oral and documentary 
evidence. The record was left open for taking post-hearing depositions and the parties submitted 
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post-hearing briefs. 1 The matter came under advisement on January 13, 2006 and is now ready 
for decision. 
ISSUES 
By agreement of the parties at hearing, the issues to be decided were: 
I. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or 
cause; 
2. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) and the extent 
thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability (PTD) in excess of 
permanent impairment, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-406 is appropriate; 
6. Whether ISIP is liable under Idaho Code §72-332; and 
7. Apportionment under the Carey formula. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Subsequent to the hearing, it became apparent that there was no dispute that Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled. Thus, issue I and issues 3-5 became moot. The parties do not 
agree as to the liability of ISIP and apportionment of Claimant's disability between BAF and 
ISIP. Claimant's position is that he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits; so long 
1 It should be noted that the last post-hearing deposition was not completed until August 3, 2005, 
more than six months after the hearing. Thereafter, the parties asked for several briefing 
extensions. 
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as he receives his benefits, it matters little to him who pays them. 
BAF asserts that Claimant had significant impairment and disabilities that were manifest 
and a hindrance to his employment prior to his 1999 injury with BAF. BAF contends that 80% 
of Claimant's disability pre-existed the 1999 accident, thus placing most of the responsibility for 
payment of benefits on ISIF. 
ISIF asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Claimant's claim against 
ISIF. Even if Claimant is not estopped from asserting his claim against ISIF, the claim fails 
because pre-existing conditions did not "combine with" his subsequent injuries to cause his total 
disability, relieving ISIF ofliabi!itypursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-332. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Claimant, Mitzie Dursteler, Brad Parkinson, Richard Livermore, 
and Joseph Milligan taken at hearing; 
2. Joint exhibits 1 through 20; 
3. Claimant's exhibits 21 through 28; 
4. Post-hearing depositions of Henry George West, Jr., D.C. (with exhibits), Barbara 
K. Nelson, M.S., CRC (with exhibits), Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D. (with exhibit), Douglas R. Crum, 
CDMS (with exhibits), and Richard Knoebel, M.D. (with exhibits).2 
All objections interposed in the depositions of Barbara Nelson, Nancy Collins, and 
Douglas Crum are overruled. Defendant's objection to the admission of page 2 of Exhibit 4 to 
Dr. Knoebel's deposition is granted (see ftn. 2). All objections interposed during the deposition 
of Dr. West are overruled with the exception of the objection stated at page 44, line 25, which is 
2 Page 2 of Exhibit 4 to Dr. Knobel' s deposition includes information developed post-hearing 
and is excluded pursuant to timely objection by Defendants. 
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sustained. After having considered all the above evidence and the briefs of the parties, the 
Referee submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the 
Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. At the time of the hearing, Claimant was 62 years of age. He resided in Shelley, 
Idaho with his wife of38 years. 
2. Claimant attended, but did not graduate from high school, leaving after he 
completed the ninth grade. He was an average student. In the early 1970s, Claimant attended a 
vocational-teclmical school in Idaho Falls where he learned welding. In the early 1980s, 
Claimant earned his GED. 
WORK HISTORY TO NOVEMBER 23, 1997 
3. Claimant worked doing welding and fabrication for about fifteen years, then 
worked as an automotive service technician for another dozen years before he began working as 
a maintenance mechanic. In 1990, Claimant went to work for Pillsbury at its Shelley potato 
processing facility. He repaired and maintained all types of equipment used to process and 
package dehydrated potato products. The job was physically demanding, requiring lifting of 7 5 
to 100 pounds on occasion. The job also required that Claimant sit, walk, stand, climb, crawl, 
bend, reach, work overhead, and push and pull. Claimant worked a demanding shift schedule 
that included regular overtime. Claimant was a reliable and valued employee. 
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
4. Claimant has a significant long-standing hearing loss. He does not recall not 
having a hearing deficit. Claimant describes his hearing loss as "an 80 percent loss in one ear 
and a 60 percent loss in the other ear." Tr., p. 39. Claimant also has a long history of respiratory 
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complaints, including chronic sinusitis, astluna, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD). Claimant saw a physician in 1997 regarding knee complaints, but did not follow up. 
None of these conditions were industrial in nature. 
5. Claimant has a history of low back complaints dating back to at least 1992. 
Lumbar x-rays in December of that year showed "[l]umbar rotoscoliosis with associated 
degenerative changes. No evidence of acute bony trauma." Ex. 4, p. 58. 
6. In March 1997, Claimant saw Donald R. Bjornson, M.D., complaining of low 
back pain that started in early January. As evidenced by his chart note of March 20, 1997, Dr. 
Bjornson was nonplussed by Claimant's complaint: 
He's had low back pain which he said started sometime the early part of January. 
In actual fact he had trouble before, in fact had x-rays in 1992 of his low back. 
Films at that time showed degenerative arthrosis of most of the lumbar spine. Got 
additional fihns today including bending fihns and he has had progression of the 
amount of disc degeneration that extends from Ll to the sacrum. Most 
prominently at L5-S 1 and L3-4 with a lot of spurring and degenerative scoliosis. 
This was present before, is worse now .... Symptoms seem pretty much under 
control with minimal medications. He's using Tylenol and I don't believe he 
wants to get involved in a therapy program. He said he's used a [brace] in the 
past and it didn't help him. His history without question goes back further than 
three months even though he said he didn't know why he wasn't having trouble 
before but he had trouble enough to be using a brace at one time and had x-rays at 
least five years ago. 
Id., at p. 59. Dr. Bjornson did not believe that Claimant was a surgical candidate, advised him to 
continue with the Tylenol, stay active, and return if his condition worsened. 
7. On November 23, 1997, Claimant was using a sledgehammer to knock a shaft out 
of a gearbox at the Pillsbury plant in Shelley when he hurt his right arm. Claimant was 
diagnosed with a ruptured bicep tendon, which was surgically repaired by Rheim Jones, M.D. 
As Claimant began to recover from the bicep tendon surgery, he continued to complain about his 
right arm and shoulder. He was eventually diagnosed with a tom rotator cuff, which Dr. Jones 
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repaired surgically. Dr. Jones released Claimant to return to work with permanent restrictions on 
May 20, 1998. Restrictions were "10 pound weight restriction at shoulder height or above, and 
no repetitive motion at shoulder height or above. Ladders are OK." Ex. 17, p. 354. Dr. Jones 
determined Claimant was at maximum medical improvement (MMI) on July 10, 1998 and gave 
him a rating of"7% permanent physical impairment of the upper extremity or 4% of the whole 
person." Id., at p. 343. 
8. In December 1998, at the request of Employer/Surety, Claimant underwent an 
independent medical exam (IME) by Dr. Knoebel. The !ME was limited to the injuries to 
Claimant's right upper extremity. Dr. Knoebel agreed with Dr. Jones' 4% whole person PPI. He 
also opined as to reasonable permanent restrictions: 
The patient currently has the ability to do medium level work with 50 pounds 
maximum lifting occasionally, 25 pounds frequently below shoulder level. The 
patient's right shoulder problems result in restrictions ofno repetitive or frequent 
reaching at or above shoulder level and no forceful work above shoulder level. 
Reasonably, IO pounds maximum lifting at or above shoulder level is maximum. 
Dr. Knoebel Depo., Ex. 2, p. 10. 
CLAIMANT'S WORK FOLLOWING 1997 ACCIDENT 
9. When Claimant was released to return to work for Pillsbury in July 1998, he had 
permanent restrictions as outlined in Findings 7 and 8, above. While Claimant's job title did not 
change, his duties did change. In an attempt to accommodate his restrictions, Pillsbury placed 
Claimant on a straight day schedule with no nights, weekends or overtime. He worked with 
another maintenance mechanic in the waste area of the plant. Claimant performed the same 
types of work that he had done in his original position with Pillsbury but without as much of the 
heavy work. He also learned how to use his left arm for many tasks. Despite Employer's best 
efforts, Claimant performed much work that was outside his restrictions. 
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10. While Claimant was still on modified duty to accommodate his right upper 
extremity restrictions, Pillsbury sold the Shelley plant to BAF. The change in ownership and 
management occurred in January 1999. As part of the sale, BAF took on Pillsbury's employees. 
Claimant was still working in a modified position in the waste area of the plant for BAF when he 
had his second industrial accident. 
MARCH 31, 1999 ACCIDENT 
11. Claimant and his co-worker were replacing a windsock when Claimant fell at 
least six feet from a ladder to the ground. He injured his left shoulder, left elbow, and his low 
back in the fall. Claimant finished his regular shift on the date of injury. 
MEDICAL CARE FOLLOWING 1999 ACCIDENT 
12. Claimant sought medical care the day after the accident. X-rays of Claimant's 
lumbosacral spine and left elbow were taken. 
Lumbosacral Spine: There is a rotatory dextroscoliosis. There is marginal 
vertebral osteophyte formation at all levels. There is degenerative disc disease at 
L3-4 and LS-S l. The disc spaces are normal. There is hypertrophic degenerative 
facet disease at L4-5 and LS-S 1. No obvious fracture. 
Left Elbow: A three view exam was done. The alignment at the joint is 
anatomic. No obvious joint effusion. There is no fracture. The bones are normal. 
Ex. 12, p. 198. Claimant was taken off work for a few days and referred to Eric D. Walker, M.D. 
13. Dr. Walker saw Claimant on April 5. He diagnosed a lumbosacral strain injury 
without neurologic involvement, left elbow contusion injury with left lateral epicondylitis, and 
left shoulder contusion with possible post-traumatic bursitis with impingement. Dr. Walker kept 
Claimant off work until April 8, and placed the following restrictions on Claimant as a result of 
his left upper extremity iajuries: 
}> No overhead work with left upper extremity; and 
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>- No lifting over 25 pounds on the left. 
Dr. Walker imposed the following restrictions on Claimant as a result of his lumbosacral strain: 
>- No repetitive bending or twisting or lifting activities; 
>- No climbing ladders; 
>- No prolonged sitting or standing without breaks. 
Dr. Walker noted that these restrictions constituted ''very sedentary work," and questioned 
whether Employer had such work available but noted that Claimant should work toward a return 
to work on April 8. 
14. When Claimant returned to Dr. Walker on April 8, he was complaining of some 
symptoms radiating into his right leg .. An MRI was ordered, and Dr. Walker continued 
Claimant's release from work. On April 13, Claimant saw Dr. Walker to review the MRI. The 
MRI showed multi-level degenerative changes and degenerative disc disease at virtually all 
levels. Dr. Walker did note one particular finding: 
There does, however, appear to be .asymmetric disc protrusion at L4-5 to the right 
with some encroachment into the neuroforamin. There is also some 
neuroforaminal narrowing at L5-S 1 bilaterally due to hypertrophic spurring of the 
joints. On my review of this in conjunction with the patient, I believe that the L4-
5 level is the only area where there is any significant lateralization or change 
which would appear more acute in nature. The study is difficult to interpret to 
some degree due to the significant scoliosis which is present. 
Ex. 3, p. 211. Dr. Walker continued Claimant's release from work, continued his physical 
therapy, and prescribed a back brace. 
15. Claimant returned to Dr. Walker on April 20. Independent observation 
corroborated that Claimant had difficulty getting in and out of his car and had an antalgic gait. 
Dr. Walker was concerned about Claimant's pain behaviors and resistance to returning to work 
in the absence of any hard neurological findings consistent with his complaints. Nevertheless, 
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and in light of the apparent IA-5 asymmetric bulge, Dr. Walker was willing to entertain the 
possibility that Claimant did sustain some injury to his low back in the March 31 fall. Dr. 
Walker also noted that the shoulder and elbow complaints were still present, but secondary to the 
low back. Dr. Walker recommended Claimant return to light-duty work for two hours per day 
the first week, four hours per day the second week, continuing to increase the hours per day 
weekly until he returned to full-time work. Restrictions included: 
> Walking to and from the worksite only; 
> No lifting greater than l O pounds; 
> Ad-lib position changes with not more than fifteen minutes in any position. 
16. Claimant returned to Dr. Walker on April 29 and again on May 5, this time angry, 
complaining, and without an appointment. While Dr. Walker believed that Claimant had some 
legitimate pain complaints, the chart note expressed concerns of symptom magnification and 
exaggerated reports of Claimant's use of pain medication. Claimant adamantly refused to 
consider an epidural steroid injection. Dr. Walker suggested that electrodiagnostic testing of the 
right lower extremity might help determine whether there were actual neural deficits consistent 
with the IA-5 disc bulge. Electrodiagnostic testing was done the same day and the results were 
normal. Dr. Walker concluded: 
Significant multi-level degenerative changes in the lumbar spine which are pre-
existing in nature. Cannot exclude, however, that the IA-5 disc still could be a 
"pain generator" with some asymmetric protrusion to the right side. 
Ex. 13, p. 221. Dr. Walker believed that Claimant could continue to work at light duty on the 
schedule that had been previously discussed. He also suggested that a functional capacity 
evaluation (FCE) might help determine Claimant's objective limitations. 
17. Claimant participated in an FCE on May 10 and 11, 1999. The therapist opined 
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that Claimant gave maximum consistent effort, but had concerns about the validity of the second 
day's tests in light of Claimant's apparently over-medicated condition. Once again, the amount 
of pain medication that Claimant claimed to be using did not jibe with the amounts that Dr. 
Walker prescribed. 
18. Relevant observations from the FCE include a correlation between heart rate and 
pain behavior, with Claimant's heart rate increasing when he reported increased pain. The 
therapist concluded that Claimant had significant deficits, which he believed were the result of 
Claimant's long-standing orthopedic problems and not the result of the March 31 accident. He 
opined that Claimant was able to do sedentary to light work and could not return to his time of 
irtjury position as a maintenance mechanic. 
19. Claimant returned to Dr. Walker following the FCE. Dr. Walker wanted a second 
opinion from Dr. Blair before declaring Claimant at MMI. As to causation, he stated: 
As I have outlined before, I am unable to state with 100% surety that the disc 
changes are all pre-existing, but I believe it more probable than not that this is the 
case. 
Ex. 13, p. 222. Emphasis added. 
20. Claimant saw Benjamin Blair, M.D., on May 24 for a second opinion. Dr. Blair 
determined that while Claimant remained symptomatic, he was at MMI. The doctor opined that 
Claimant was capable of performing sedentary to light work for an eight-hour day and forty-hour 
week. Dr. Blair determined that Claimant fell within the DRE lumbosacral category II of the 
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed. (AMA Guides, 4th ed.), giving 
him a 5% whole person impairment rating. Dr. Blair opined that 80% of Claimant's impairment 
pre-existed his fall and 20% was attributable to the fall. Thus, I% of the PPI was apportioned to 
the fall, and 4% was found to be pre-existing. Restrictions pertaining to Claimant's low back 
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included ad-lib positional changes and limits on walking, standing, bending, stooping, lifting, 
squatting or crouching. 
POST-ACCIDENT EMPLOYMENT 
21. Claimant continued to work in a sedentary capacity, increasing his work hours 
until he was working eight hours per day. About the time that Claimant had worked up to eight-
hour workdays, he was given permanent restrictions that precluded his return to a maintenance 
mechanic position. Employer could not permanently accommodate Claimant's restrictions and 
he was let go in June 1999. Claimant has not worked since his separation from BAF. 
POST-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL RECORDS 
22. Dr. Wheeler. Claimant saw Ronald D. Wheeler, M.D., in September 1999 for an 
orthopedic evaluation of his back, left shoulder and left elbow. Dr. Wheeler did not dispute 
either the determination by Drs. Walker and Jones that Claimant was at MMI, or their 
impairment rating or its apportionment. 
23. Dr. Jones. In November 1999, Claimant returned to see Dr. Jones, complaining of 
a painful left shoulder and elbow since the March accident. Ultimately, Dr. Jones diagnosed a 
rotator cuff tear, which he attributed to the March 31, 1999 fall. Dr. Jones performed a surgical 
repair of the left shoulder on March 28, 2000. On May 31, Dr. Jones determined Claimant had 
reached MMI from the rotator cuff repair. Dr. Jones found no permanent impairment following 
repair, so did not rate the left shoulder. 
24. Gail Fields, M.D. In March 2002, Claimant underwent an arthroscopic medial 
meniscectomy of his left knee. This was a non-industrial injury and Claimant made a full 
recovery. 
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25. Dr. Clark. Edwin M. Clark, M.D., evaluated Claimant in December 2002. First, 
Dr. Clark opined that Claimant ''was rushed through an impairment rating, and was pushed out 
of the system within six weeks time without appropriate treatment." Ex. 3, p. 053. He also 
found it odd that Dr. Jones awarded Claimant no PPI for the left shoulder repair, especially since 
Dr. Jones awarded 4% whole person impairment for the right shoulder injury. Dr. Clark opined 
that according to the AMA Guides, 5th ed., Claimant was entitled to a l % whole person rating on 
the left shoulder because of limited internal rotation. Finally, Dr. Clark rated Claimant's lumbar 
spine impairment. Using the AMA Guides, 5th ed., Dr. Clark determined that Claimant was in a 
DRE lumbar category II, which provides for impairment of 5% to 8% of the whole person. Dr. 
Clark assumed the maximum impairment of 8%. Regarding apportionment, Dr. Clark reasoned: 
. . . recognizing the fact that the patient was asymptomatic prior to the injury, 
doing his usual and customary duties and not on medications or treating, 
apportionment factor would then be 50% due to the industrial injury and 50% due 
to the preexisting degenerative lumbar disease. 
Id. This resulted in 4% whole person PPI for Claimant's low back attributable to the March 
1999 accident. 
26. Dr. West. In December 2004, two years after Dr. Clark's evaluation of Claimant, 
and four years, nine months after the March 1999 accident, Claimant saw Henry G. West, D.C., 
for an evaluation of injuries arising from the 1999 accident. Dr. West rated Claimant with 24% 
whole person PPI which included 21 % for his spine, 2% for his left upper extremity, and l % for 
his right upper extremity. Dr. West apportioned the 24% PPI as 75% pre-existing and 25% a 
permanent aggravation of his pre-existing condition. This resulted in a 6% whole person PPL In 
his deposition, Dr. West conceded that he may have erred when he included the left shoulder 
impairment in the apportionment, as there was no evidence that it was pre-existing. 
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27. Dr. Knoebel. ln January 2005, Dr. Knoebel was asked to review the medical 
records of Claimant. ln pertinent part, Dr. Knoebel disagreed with Dr. West's PPI rating 
regarding Claimant's upper extremity injuries. He noted that Claimant had already been rated 
for the right shoulder, and the March 1999 accident did not increase the right shoulder 
impairment. As to the left shoulder, Dr. Knoebel believed that the 2% PPI rating for the left 
rotator cuff repair should not have been apportioned as it related entirely to the March 1999 
accident. Dr. Knoebel also disputed Dr. West's PPI rating for Claimant's lumbar spine. While 
he agreed that the March 1999 accident resulted in a permanent aggravation of Claimant's long-
standing and symptomatic low back pain, Dr. Knoebel disagreed with Dr. West's methodology 
in calculating both components of the 21 % whole person impairment related to Claimant's spinal 
impairment. Dr. Knoebel agreed with Dr. Blair's 5% PPI for Claimant's low back, of which I% 
was attributable to the March 1999 industrial accident. 
VOCATIONAL EVIDENCE 
28. Although the fact of Claimant's total and permanent disability is not in issue, the 
timing of its onset is at issue. Three different vocational experts had the opportunity to weigh in 
on Claimant's disability status and when it occurred. 
29. Barbara Nelson. Claimant contracted with Barbara Nelson to prepare an analysis 
of Claimant's employability following the March 1999 injury. After a thorough review of 
Claimant's medical, work, and social history, Ms. Nelson opined in her February 2005 report 
that prior to his March 1999 accident, Claimant had restrictions and had lost access to some 
portion of the job market but was still employable in "light to medium jobs that did not involve 
much overhead work, such as small engine repair work, certain manufacturing jobs, agricultural 
sorting jobs, certain production jobs, and some lighter janitorial jobs." Nelson Depo., Ex. 3, p. 
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13. Emphasis added. In her deposition she opined: 
A. It's my opinion that [Claimant] is totally and permanently disabled due to 
the combination of his impairments and the nonmedical factors of his case. 
Q. In arriving at that opinion, did you consider both medical and nonmedical 
factors? 
A. Idid. 
Q. And what are the medical factors that you considered? 
A. Medical factors include his low-back impairment, his bilateral shoulder 
impairment, his hearing loss, his knee condition, his left elbow condition, his 
chronic sinusitis, and asthma. That's all. 
Q. And what nonmedical factors did you consider? 
A. His age, his limited education, his limited transferable skills for work that 
he can now physically perform. 
Nelson Depo, p. 11. 
30. Douglas N. Crum. Employer/Surety contracted with Douglas Crum to prepare an 
analysis of Claimant's disability resulting from his 1999 industrial injuries. Mr. Crum's report is 
dated November 2004. The gist of Mr. Crum's analysis is that Claimant sustained no disability 
in excess of his impairment as a result of the 1999 accident. Mr. Crum reasoned that the 
restrictions imposed as a result of his 1997 right shoulder injury precluded Claimant from 
performing the duties of his job of maintenance mechanic and many of the mechanical or 
fabricating jobs that he had previously held. The restrictions imposed as a result of the 1997 
accident subsumed any restrictions that resulted from the 1999 accident, so that the later accident 
had no significant effect on Claimant's physical capacities. 
31. Mr. Crum was deposed in June 2005 and at that time was of the opinion that 
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as a result of his lifting restrictions and the 
necessity for ad-lib positional changes. In his deposition, Mr. Crum opined that the 
apportionment of Claimant's disability to pre-existing conditions offered by Drs. West, Blair, 
and Knoebel (20-25% resulting from the 1999 accident and 75-80% pre-existing), were 
reasonable. However, as to when Claimant became disabled, he maintained his position that it 
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was the 1997 accident together with Claimant's then-pre-existing conditions that caused his total 
and permanent disability: 
Q. (By Mr. Curtis] ... are you just saying it was totally related to the '97 plus 
the preexisting that caused him to be a total perm and the '99 accident had 
nothing to do with it? 
A. It appears to me that that's the case. That the '97 injury and the 
preexisting caused the total perm disability. 
Crum Depo., p. 39. 
32. Nancy Collins. ISIF retained Nancy Collins to prepare a vocational assessment 
regarding Claimant's employability and vocational disability resulting from his March 1999 
accident. Dr. Collins' report, dated January 2005, concluded that Claimant was significantly 
disabled as a result of his 1999 back injury, and lacked earning capacity because of his need for 
ad-lib positional changes. She opined that the lifting restrictions relating to the right shoulder 
were significant, but did not contribute to Claimant's disability "as he is taken out of the labor 
market by the back injury alone." Dr. Collins Depo., Ex. A, p. 8. Dr. Collins took exception to 
Mr. Crum' s opinion that the 1999 accident had no effect on Claimant's disability, stating: 
I understand that [Claimant] had minor back pain and objective degeneration prior 
to the 1999 injury, but he did not lose work because of back pain, and he did not 
have limitations from his physicians. It appears the 1999 injury permanently 
aggravated this back condition to the point that he was unable to return to work. 
Id. Dr. Collins' deposition testimony was consistent with her report, and she reiterated that it 
was the back injuries that took Claimant out of the job market. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
33. The agreement of the parties that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled 
moots many of the issues identified at the outset of this proceeding. In particular, issues 
concerning pre-existing conditions and apportionment of those conditions pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 72-406, and determination of PPI and PPD are no longer at issue. 
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· 34. Medical Care. Claimant raised the issue of entitlement to medical care, but since 
this is an accepted claim, entitlement to reasonably necessary medical care is statutory pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 72-432. The only evidence presented regarding medical care was the testimony 
of Claimant at hearing that he estimated there was approximately $500.00 in outstanding medical 
bills related to the 1999 accident. No documentary evidence was presented to allow the Referee 
to determine the existence or extent of outstanding medical costs. To the extent that Claimant 
can provide reliable documentation, consisting of either current unpaid invoices from providers 
or proof that Claimant has paid providers for services related to his March 1999 accident, BAF 
shall either pay or reimburse those costs. The Commission declines to address future medical 
care, as the need for such care is speculative at this time. 
ISIF LIABILITY 
Collateral Estoppel 
35. ISIF contends that Claimant is precluded from even bringing a claim against ISIF 
because he entered into an agreement with Pillsbury and its surety for lump sum settlement 
(LSS) of his 1997 iajury that contained the following language: 
After attorney fees and costs, Claimant will receive $17,803.03 which also 
includes settlement of Claimant's claim for loss of future wage earning ability and 
claim for total and permanent disability. This lump sum settlement represents l 05 
periodic monthly payments of $169.95 from the date of the alleged injury until 
Claimant reaches 65 years of age for purposes of computing any worker's (sic] 
compensation offset in the event Claimant becomes entitled to Title II Social 
Security disability benefits. 
Ex. 20, p. 452. ISIF argues that because the phrase "total and permanent disability" appears in 
the LSS agreement that was ultimately approved by the Commission, Claimant cannot assert in 
this proceeding that he was not totally and permanently disabled at the time of the LSS. ISIF 
cites to Jackman v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 P.2d. 1207 (1997) in 
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support of its argument. Jackman and its progeny, Clark v. Truss, _ Idaho ---Y 128 P .3d 941 
(2006) are inapposite on the facts of this case. Both Jackman and Clark concerned the PPI 
ratings that had been associated with the breakout of benefits in prior LSS agreements, and 
whether the Claimant was bound by those ratings in a later, adjudicated proceeding. 
Leaving aside the substantive issue of whether, in fact, a Commission approval of a 
settlement agreement is tantamount to a final judgment in a litigated case,3 the language in the 
LSS agreement at issue in this proceeding can hardly be characterized as an assertion that 
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled as a result of his 1997 accident. Rather, the 
language in the LSS agreement merely acknowledges that in exchange for valuable consideration 
Claimant is relinquishing all future benefits to which he might otherwise be entitled as a result of 
the 1997 injury that was the subject of the settlement. Such benefits might have included 
medical care or additional impairment or disability, including permanent total disability. 
Waiving the possibility of a future claim of total permanent disability is poles apart from a 
binding assertion that Claimant was totally permanently disabled at the time he entered into the 
LSS agreement. 
Idaho Code§ 72-332 
36. Idaho Code § 72-332(1) provides that if an employee who has a permanent 
physical impairment from any cause or origin incurs a subsequent disability by injury arising out 
of and in the course of his or her employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the 
preexisting impairment and the subsequent injury suffers total and permanent disability, the 
3 The Court in Jackman reiterated the five-part test for determining whether collateral estoppel or 
issue preclusion bars a claim. All of the tests relate to the litigated case that concludes with a 
final judgment. These tests are inapplicable in an administrative proceeding that is compromised 
by settlement rather than being litigated or adjudicated. While the Commission's approval of the 
LSS agreements may amount to a final disposition of the proceeding, such approval does not 
constitute a judgment in a fully adjudicated case. 
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employer and its surety will be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the 
disability caused by the injury, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder 
of his or her income benefits out of the ISIF account. 
In Dumaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, I 18 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 {1990), the Idaho 
Supreme Court set out the four conditions that must be met in order to establish ISIF liability 
under Idaho Code§ 72-332: 
( 1) Whether there was indeed a preexisting impairment; 
(2) Whether that impairment was manifest; 
(3) Whether the alleged impairment was a subjective hindrance; and 
(4) Whether the alleged impairment in any way combines in causing total disability. 
Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 317. Because BAF impleaded ISIF, it bears the burden of 
proving ISIF liability. 
37. There is no dispute between BAF and ISIF that Claimant had a pre-existing 
impairment (the right arm and shoulder injuries) and that the impairment was manifest (Claimant 
had permanent restrictions on lifting and working overhead). ISIF takes the position that BAF 
has failed to prove the two remaining elements required for ISIF liability: ISIF contends that 
Claimant's pre-existing impairments were either not serious enough to constitute a hindrance or 
obstacle to his obtaining employment, or they did not combine with his subsequent injuries to 
cause his total permanent disability. 
. Subjective Hindrance 
38. The test for determining whether a pre-existing impairment constitutes a 
subjective hindrance or obstacle to. employment is set out in Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 
I 17 Idaho 166, 786 P.2d 557 (1990). A finding of subjective hindrance does not tum solely on a 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 18 
claimant's attitude about a pre-existing condition. As noted by the Court in Archer, if that were 
the case, the requirement would be meaningless in the case of both the hypochondriacal claimant 
and the hero claimant. Instead, the Court stated: 
. . . evidence of the claimant's attitude toward the pre-existing condition, the 
claimant's medical condition before and after the injury or disease for which 
compensation is sought, nonmedical factors concerning the claimant, as well as 
expert opinions and other evidence concerning the effect of the pre-existing 
condition on the claimant's employability will all be admissible. 
117 Idaho at 172, 786 P.2d at 563. 
39. In the case at bar, Claimant had a number ofconditions that preaexisted his 1999 
injury, including degenerative disease of his lumbar spine, significant hearing loss, chronic 
· sinusitis, asthma, bad knees, and restrictions on his right upper extremity. The record as a whole 
indicates that Claimant's chronic sinusitis, asthma, and bad knees did not constitute singly or 
together, a subjective hindrance to employment. Likewise, the degenerative condition of his low 
back could not be said to constitute a subjective hindrance. Prior to the 1999 accident, it did not 
preclude any of his chosen activities. He received no regular treatment, and used only the 
occasional over-the-counter Tylenol for pain relief. While Claimant's low back appeared from 
all objective medical imaging to be a ticking bomb, it is the nature of such bombs that their 
presence is not noticeable until they detonate, in Claimant's case, when he fell from the ladder in 
1999. 
40. The same cannot be said of his hearing loss or his right upper extremity injuries. 
While Claimant's hearing impairment was not industrial in nature, and had never been rated, it 
did constitute a subjective hindrance to employment. Claimant may not have viewed it as an 
obstacle, and in fact it may not have been an obstacle in his time-of-injury-position or similar 
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positions within his occupational title.4 However, once Claimant was limited to sedentary to 
light work with ad-lib positional changes, the hearing impairment became a very real obstacle to 
Claimant's employability. 
41. Similarly, the right upper extremity impairment was an obstacle to employment 
because of the lifting and overhead work limitations. All three vocational experts concur that 
prior to his 1997 accident, Claimant had performed medium to heavy work. The restrictions 
resulting from his 1997 accident precluded him from doing heavy work. In fact, Claimant never 
returned to his pre-1997 injury position. All three vocational experts agreed that Claimant had 
lost access to a portion of the job market as a result of his 1997 injuries and the subsequent 
lifting restrictions. 
42. Applying the test for determining whether an impairment is a hindrance or 
obstacle set out in Archer leads to the conclusion that Claimant's pre-existing hearing and right 
upper extremity impairments were a subjective hindrance to his obtaining employment. 
Combined Effects 
43. To satisfy the "combined effects" requirement in I.C. § 72-332(1 ), it must be 
shown that but for the preexisting impairments, the claimant would not have been totally 
permanently disabled. Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P. 2d 1973 (1989). 
(Emphasis added). Although the "combined effects" requirement of Idaho Code § 72-332 has 
generated a number of appellate decisions, most of the litigated cases have involved two 
cominon scenarios: 1) where the claimant was already totally and permanently disabled as an 
odd-lot worker prior .to the most recent industrial injury; and 2) where the claimant became 
totally and permanently disabled solely as a result of the most recent industrial injury. The Court 
4 Claimant had hearing aids in the past that he refused to wear. He was not open to trying more 
recently developed aids. 
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has carefully laid out a framework for analyzing these two fact patterns and determined that the 
"combined effects" requirement has not been met in either situation. 
44. While BAF asserts that most of Claimant's disability resulted from the 1997 
accident, the record just does not support such a position, Mr. Crum's opinion notwithstanding. 
Neither does the record support ISIF' s assertion that Claimant was totally and permanently 
disabled by the 1999 accident alone. 
45. If one considers only Claimant's rated industrial impairments, then it is arguable 
that his total permanent disability could be assigned to the 1999 accident alone. Undoubtedly, 
the restrictions relating to his low back made his right upper extremity restrictions meaningless. 
However, the statutory language ofldaho Code § 72-332 does not limit the consideration of pre-
existing impairments only to those that are rated and are industrial in nature. It includes 
permanent physical impairments "from any cause or origin" including those that are congenital 
or caused by disease or non-industrial injuries. Claimant's significant and life-long hearing loss 
is just such a pre-existing permanent impairment. Applying the "but for" test to the facts of this 
case, the Referee finds that the disability resulting from Claimant's I 999 accident combined with 
the effects of his significant hearing loss to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled. 
In reaching this conclusion the Referee finds the vocational opinions of Barbara Nelson 
· to be the most persuasive. Mr. Crum's conclusion that Claimant's back injury and related 
restrictions had little or no effect on his employability is unsupportable on the record. Dr. 
. Collins, while fully considering the effects of the back injury and restrictions on Claimant's 
employability, limited her analysis of the ''combined effects" to the right shoulder, ignoring 
Claimant's significant hearing loss entirely. · Ms, Nelson consistently stated throughout her report 
and her deposition that Claimant's hearing deficit could not be ignored in his disability analysis. 
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Her opinion that, subsequent to the 1999 accident, there were some sedentary to light 
occupations that Claimant would have been able to do but for his hearing loss is supported by the 
record. Further, it comports with the over-arching tenet that the workers' compensation statutes 
are to be liberally construed as well as the more specific purposes of Idaho Code § 72-332 to 
encourage employers to hire individuals with manifest disabilities. 
CAREY APPORTIONMENT 
46. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent impairment" is a medical appraisal of the 
nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured worker's personal efficiency in 
the activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, normal living postures, 
ambulation, elevation, traveling, and non-specialized activities of bodily members. Idaho Code 
§ 72-424. When determining impairment, the opinions of physicians are advisory only. The 
Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impairment. Urry v. Walker Fox Masonry Contractors, 
115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). 
Pre-existing Impairment 
47. Right Upper Extremity. Prior to the 1999 accident, Claimant had an undisputed 
right upper extremity impairment rated at 4% of the whole person. 
48. Hearing. Claimant's pre-existing hearing impairment was never rated as it was 
non-industrial. Because the hearing loss is such a significant pre-existing impairment, and is the 
basis for ISIF liability, some rating must be assigned to it in order to apportion liability between 
BAF and ISIF. 
The AMA Guides, 5th ed., uses a mathematical approach to assessing impairment due to 
hearing loss. It requires calculating the decibel sum of the hearing threshold levels (DSHL) for 
each ear and then using a special chart to combine the values to obtain binaural hearing 
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impairment, which is then converted into a whole person impairment. While there is one very 
old audiometry test in the record, that test does not provide the information necessary to calculate 
Claimant's DSHL. However, there is adequate information in the record to discern that many of 
Claimant's activities of daily living are impacted by his hearing loss. These include difficulty 
with communication at home, in restaurants, and in public places. Example 11-3, p. 251 of the 
AMA Guides, 5th ed., is an example of the type of factors that support an 8% whole person 
impairment rating. While the Referee suspects that Claimant's hearing impairment rating might 
be substantially higher if calculated based on DSHL, an 8% PPI is fully supportable by the AMA 
Guides, whereas any higher rating would be pure speculation on the Commission's part. 
49. Lumbar Spine. Whole person ratings for Claimant's pre-existing degenerative 
lumbar spine range from 21 % {Dr. West) to 2% (Dr, Clark), with Dr. Knoebel coming in at 4% 
and Dr. Blair at 5%. If Dr. West's 15% rating for loss of range of motion is disregarded, his 
impairment rating of Claimant's low back is 7% whole person.5 Averaging the lumbar 
impairments of the four physicians results in an impairment of 4.5% whole person impairment. 
All of the rating physicians agree that 75% .to 80% of that lumbar impairment was pre-existing. 
Averaging the two apportionments results in a figure of 77.5% pre-existing and a whole person 
pre-existing lumbar impairment of3.49%. 
50. Combined Pre-Existing Impairment. Combining Claimant's 4% right upper 
extremity impairment with his 8% hearing impairment and 3 .49% lumbar impairment results in a 
combined 15.5% whole person pre-existing impairment. 
5 The Referee agrees with Dr. Knoebel that the ROM method utilized by Dr. West in reaching 
his 21 % rating for Claimant's lumbar spine was contrary to the AMA Guides. The 7% rating that 
Dr. West combined with the ROM impairment to determine the final PPI rating is consistent with 
the DRE methodology used by the other physicians in arriving at their ratings. 
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Impairment From Last Accident 
51. Left Shoulder. Whole person impainnent ratings for Claimant's left shoulder 
injury range from a high of2% from Dr. West, to 1% by Dr. Clark, and 0% from Drs. Knoebel 
and Jones. It makes no sense that the surgical repair of Claimant's left shoulder resulted in no 
impainnent. Claimant would have had functional limitations resulting from the repair, had they 
not already been subsumed by the limitations imposed as a result of the right arm injury. The 
Referee finds Dr. Clark's 1 % rating the most reasonable on the facts, given that the injury to 
Claimant's left shoulder was not as extensive as his right shoulder injury and did not involve his 
biceps tendon. 
52. Lumbar Spine. Ratings for Claimant's lumbar spine impainnent following the 
1999 accident were assessed at 1 % by Drs. Knoebel and Blair, at 2% by Dr. Clark, and at 5.25% 
by Dr. West. The average of those ratings is 2.31 %. 
53. Combined Irnpainnent from 1999 Accident. Combining the 2.3% impairment for 
Claimant's lumbar spine and his l % impairment for his left shoulder results in a combined whole 
person impairment of3%. 
Calculation of CareyApportionment 
54. In Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 108, 686 P.2d 54 
(1984), the Idaho Court determined that in the case of ISIF liability, the non-medical factors 
would be prorated in proportion of the respective percentages of responsibility for the physical 
impairment. In. this case, Claimant's total disability due to medical factors is 18.5%. Of that 
amount, 15.5% was pre-existing, and 3% was due to his 1999 accident. Claimant is 100% 
disabled, so an additional 81.5% of nonmedical factors must be apportioned between BAF and 
ISIF. ISIF is liable for 15.5/18.5 or 84% of the nonmedical disability and BAF is liable for 
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3/18.5 or 16% of the nonmedical disability. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
2. ISIF is liable for 84% of Claimant's permanent total disability pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 72-332. 
3. BAF is liable for the remaining 16% of Claimant's permanent total disability. 
4. BAF is responsible for the medical care that was reasonably necessary following 
Claimant's 1999 accident and shall compensate Claimant for any unpaid medical costs, including· 
interest and penalties, if applicable, upon presentation of invoices and proof of payment. 
5. All other issues are moot. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this 61 day of April, 2006. 
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APR 2 5 2006 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Rinda Just submitted the record in the 
above-entitled matter, together with her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, to the 
members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned 
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendation of the Referee. The 
Commission concurs with this recommendation. Therefore, the Commission approves, confirms, 
and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
ORDER-I 
2. ISIF is liable for 84% of Claimant's permanent total disability pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-332. 
3. BAF is liable for the remaining 16% of Claimant's permanent total disability. 
4. BAF is responsible ,for the medical care that was reasonably necessary following 
Claimant's 1999 accident and shall compensate Claimant for any unpaid medical costs, including 
interest and penalties, if applicable, upon presentation of invoices and proof of payment. 
5. All other issues are moot. 
6. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-734, all compensation due and payable pursuant to 
this decision shall accrue interest from the date of the Commission's Order at the statutory rate of 
8.375% as set by the State Treasurer effective July 1, 2005. 
7. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated . 
. DATED this ~ S day of April, 2006. 
ORDER-2 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter 
to Referee Alan Taylor, who conducted a hearing in Pocatello on November 22, 2006. Claimant, 
Charles Mick Wallingford, was present in person and represented by Daniel J. Luker of Pocatello. 
Defendant, State ofldaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF), was represented by Anthony W. 
Valdez of Twin Falls. Defendant Employer, City of Pocatello, and Defendant Surety, State Insurance 
Fund, settled with Claimant prior to hearing and thus did not appear at hearing. The remaining 
parties presented oral and documentary evidence. This matter was then continued for the taking of a 
post-hearing deposition, the submission of briefs, and subsequently came under advisement on March 
12, 2007. The case is now ready for decision. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be resolved are: 
1. Whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled; 
2. Whether ISIF is liable under Idaho Code§ 72-332; and 
3. Apportionment pursuant to the formula set forth in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 
107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984). 
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant argues he is totally and permanently disabled, noting that vocational expert Terry L. 
Montague has concluded he is unemployable. Claimant asserts he suffers 5% impairment of the 
whole person due to his 2005 industrial accident plus an additional 48% impairment of the whole 
person due to preexisting right knee, left hand, Hepatitis B infection, chronic obstmctive pulmonary 
disorder, and lumbar and cervical conditions. Claimant asserts that his preexisting physical 
impairments were manifest, hindered him in obtaining employment, and have combined 
2005 industrial injury to render him totally and permanently disabled. 
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ISIF argues that Claimant has not carried his burden of establishing that he is totally and permanently 
disabled. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
I. The testimony of Claimant taken at the November 22, 2006, hearing; 
2. Joint Exhibits A through S admitted at the hearing; and 
3. The deposition of Terry L. Montague, taken by Claimant on December 5, 2006. 
After having fully considered all of the above evidence, and the arguments of the parties, the Referee 
submits the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Claimant was born in 1955. He was 51 years old and had resided in Pocatello for several years at 
the time of the hearing. Claimant is right-handed. His father served in the military and Claimant 
resided in a number of locations as a youth. He did not complete high school. Claimant joined the 
Army where he obtained his GED and received training in a1tillery. Claimant left the Anny after 
serving for three years and then worked in construction and played the guitar in a band in southern 
California before moving to Idaho. Claimant played by ear and has never read music. 
2. In 1980, Claimant took a machinist tech class but was never employed as a machinist. After 
moving to Idaho, Claimant worked mostly in construction, including concrete flatwork, and 
continued to perfonn as a musician and teach guitar lessons. 
3. In approximately 1991, Claimant was employed by STS marking and locating underground 
utilities. In this work he pulled manhole covers and used a pick and shovel and other devices to 
locate underground cables. Claimant's position ended when STS lost its contract. 
4. Claimant was employed as a groundskeeper at Idaho State University (ISU) for a number of years. 
While working for !SU, on November I 5, 1993, Claimant fractured his right patella. He recovered 
substantially from that injury but continues to experience occasional locking and soreness in his right 
knee. He was given a 2% whole person impainnent rating for his residual right knee condition. 
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5. While working in 1994, approximately 600 pounds fell on, and crushed, Claimant's left hand, 
fracturing his left thumb. He largely recovered from this injury but continues to experience numbness 
in his left thumb, ring, and little fingers to the extent that he drops things occasionally and can no 
longer play the guitar well. He was given a 6% left hand impairment rating for his residual left hand 
condition. 
6. In 1997, Claimant's vehicle was rear-ended and he suffered a wrenched neck. 
7. In approximately 1999, Claimant began experiencing intense coughing episodes, severe enough to 
cause a rib fracture on more than one occasion. In approximately 200 l, Claimant was diagnosed with 
chronic obstructive pulmonaiy disease (COPD). His COPD is aggravated and triggered by extensive 
talking and strong aromas, including fumes from diesel fuel, fresh asphalt, paints, and some cooking 
oils and perfumes. 
8. In 2002, Claimant became ill with prolonged flu-like symptoms. He was eventually diagnosed 
with Hepatitis B. Claimant had no customaiy risk factors, and believes he contracted the disease 
from eating food contaminated by a Hepatitis B infected food-handler. Although now in remission, 
medical providers have advised Claimant that his infection will be life-long. Claimant has sought 
employment in the food services and health care fields, but has been advised that he is not 
employable in these fields because of having contracted Hepatitis B and the risks of transmission. 
9. In approximately 2002, Claimant was granted Social Security Disability benefits when his COPD 
became severely debilitating. He received benefits for 16 months. Claimant learned to better manage 
his COPD by walking for exercise and avoiding aggravating fumes. He ultimately advised the 
disability judge that he wanted to return to work. 
I 0. In 2003, Claimant returned to work for the City of Pocatello in the water department. He did not 
advise the city of his COPD or other physical challenges because he wanted the job. His work duties 
included the regular use of a pick, shovel, and jack hammer. When faced with work tasks such as 
painting, which he knew from experience would aggravate his COPD, he volunteered for other 
strenuous work assignments. Claimant dropped tools occasionally due to his left hand numbness. 
11. After working for two years in the water depa1tment, Claimant's back became sore from the 
strenuous physical work, prompting him to transfer to the Pocatello Zoo. After a few months he 
transferred to the water treatment plant. Claimant earned $9. 75 per hour and usually worked 40 hours 
per week, nine or ten months of the year. Depending upon the weather, he was laid off for 
approximately two months each year. 
12. On July I, 2005, Claimant was at work helping remove fence posts along the PortneufRiver 
when an undercut riverbank gave way and he fell approximately eight feet injuring his back and neck. 
Claimant completed his shift with difficulty, hoping to recuperate over the July 4'" holiday. 
Unfortunately his symptoms worsened, and he sought medical care. 
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13. Claimant was ultimately treated by Dr. Eric Roberts and MRI scans revealed two bulging lumbar 
disks and a bulging cervical disk. Claimant received medications and underwent physical therapy, 
however, he continues to experience headaches, back pain, and leg pain. 
14. Claimant was assisted by Industrial Commission rehabilitation consultant Sarah Brown in 
Pocatello in his search for employment. Their efforts resulted in only one employment lead which 
was with a telemarketing firm. Claimant's COPD and repeated coughing precluded his employment 
in telemarketing. 
15. Claimant underwent functional testing, which placed his abilities at the sedentary level. Dr. 
Roberts has imposed extensive permanent physical restrictions. 
16. Since his 2005 injury, Claimant has been unable to engage in many of his favorite pre-injury 
recreational activities including hiking, gardening, and hunting. 
17. At the time of hearing, Claimant continued to suffer back, neck, and leg pain. Having reviewed 
the evidence and observed Claimant at hearing, the Referee finds that Claimant is a credible witness. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
18. The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 793 P.2d 187 (1990). The humane 
purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 
Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). 
19. Total Permanent Disability. Before the ISIF may potentially be held liable for any benefits, 
Claimant herein must. first establish that he is totally and permanently disabled. Idaho Code § 72-
332. 
20. Impairment. An evaluation of peimanent disability begins with consideration of permanent 
physical impai1ment. "Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional abnonnality or loss after 
maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnonnality or loss, medically, is 
considered stable or nonprogressive at the time of evaluation. Idaho Code § 72-422. "Evaluation 
(rating) of pennanent impainnent" is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or 
disease as it affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such as 
self-care, communication, nonnal living postures, ambulation, traveling, and nonspecialized activities 
of bodily members. Idaho Code§ 72-424. When detennining impaim1ent, the opinions of physicians 
are advisory only. The Commission is the ultimate evaluator ofimpainnent. Urry v. Walker & Fox 
Masonry Contractors, I 15 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). 
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21. Claimant alleges permanent impairments due to the condition of his lumbar and cervical spine, 
right knee, left hand, COPD, and Hepatitis B infection. 
22. Dr. Roberts rated Claimant's lumbar and cervical spine impaim1ent at 10% of the whole person. 
He apportioned 50% of this impainnent to Claimant's 2005 industrial accident and 50% to preexisting 
conditions. The medical evidence indicates preexisting scoliosis. Dr. Roberts' rating is adequately 
explained and persuasive. 
23. Dr. Hugh Selznick rated Claimant's right knee impairment at 2% of the whole person due to his 
patellar fracture. His rating is adequately explained and persuasive. 
24. Dr. Stephen Maloff rated Claimant's left hand impairment at 6% of the hand due to his left hand 
crush injury. His rating is adequately explained and persuasive. This equates to 3% impairment of 
the whole person. 
25. Dr. George Pfortner rated Claimant's impainnent from COPD at 33% of the whole person. At 
hearing Claimant coughed repeatedly. The medical evidence establishes recurring episodes of 
coughing sufficiently severe to result in fractured ribs on multiple occasions. Dr. Pfortner's rating is 
supported by the concurrence of Dr. Lee Kornfield, is well explained and persuasive. 
26. The record contains no impairment rating for Claimant's Hepatitis B infection. Nevertheless, 
Claimant urges an impairment of 5%. While this infection will apparently be life-long, Drs. Pfortner 
and Kornfield found no impainnent was warranted since it was in remission. The Referee declines to 
speculatively assess a rating for Claimant's Hepatitis B infection. 
27. Claimant has proven he suffers permanent physical impairments of 10% of the whole person due 
to his lumbar and cervical condition, 2% of the whole person due to his right knee condition, 3% of 
the whole person due to his left hand condition, and 33% of the whole person due to his COPD, thus 
totaling 48% of the whole person. 
28. Permanent Disability. "Permanent disability" or "under a pennanent disability" results when the 
actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because ofpennanent 
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. Idaho 
Code§ 72-423. "Evaluation (rating) ofpennanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured 
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the 
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in Idaho Code 
§ 72-430. Idaho Code§ 72-425. 
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Idaho Code § 72-430(1) provides that in determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account 
should be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to 
handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple 
injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of accident causing the injury, 
or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of 
the affected employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area 
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors as the 
Commission may deem relevant. The focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the 
claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7,896 P.2d 329,333 
(1995). 
29. There are two methods by which a claimant can demonstrate he or she is totally and pennanently 
disabled. First, a claimant may prove total and permanent disability if his or her medical impairment 
together with pertinent nonmedical factors totals I 00%. If, however, the claimant fails to prove 
I 00% disability, he or she can still demonstrate total disability by fitting within the definition of an 
odd-lot worker. Boley v. State, Industrial S12ecial Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P .2d 854, 
857 (1997). Claimant herein asserts that he is I 00% pennanently disabled and also that he is totally 
and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. 
30. As noted above, Claimant has permanent physical impainnents totaling 48% of the whole person. 
31. Dr. Roberts found Claimant's lumbar and cervical spine had reached maximum medical 
improvement on November 17, 2005. After a two-day functional capacity evaluation, Dr. Roberts 
permanently restricted Claimant to sedentary work. Dr. Roberts noted that Claimant will require 
positional changes every IO to 20 minutes. He restricted Claimant to lifting no more than IO pounds, 
no pushing more than 99 pounds, and no pulling more than 60 pounds. Dr. Roberts further restricted 
Claimant from repetitive bending, lifting, or squatting. He allowed occasional reaching with right 
and left upper extremities, prolonged sitting, bending, lifting, stair climbing, elevated work, 
balancing, and bending with reaching. Dr. Roberts also restricted Claimant from extreme of neck 
range of motion activities. 
32. Industrial Commission rehabilitation consultant Sarah Brown assisted Claimant in searching for 
employment in the Pocatello area. In spite of assistance from Brown, Claimant did not obtain 
employment. 
33. Claimant retained vocational rehabilitation expert Terry Montague to evaluate his employability. 
Montague recognized Claimant's considerable restrictions and limited transferable skills and opined 
that Claimant suffered a I 00% loss of access to the labor market. He concluded Claimant was totally 
and permanently disabled. 
Decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission - Compiled by AccuScan 
Wallingford 7 
2001 nc 0449 
This Decision STARTS at: 
07 !WCDnone 
34. Based on Claimant's impainnent ratings totaling 48% of the whole person, his permanent work 
restrictions arising from his lumbar and cervical spine condition, and considering nonmedical factors 
including his age of 51 at the time of the accident, limited formal education, lack of experience and 
transferable skills in sedentary and light occupations, computer illiteracy, inability to return to his 
previous occupations, and Hepatitis B infection, Claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity has 
been significantly reduced. The Referee finds Claimant has established a pennanent disability of 
90%, inclusive of his 48% whole person impairment. 
35. Odd-lot. A claimant who is not 100% permanently disabled may still prove total permanent 
disability by establishing he or she is an odd-Jot worker. An odd-lot worker is one "so injured that he 
[ or she] can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or 
quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 8 I, 921 P .2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Such workers are not regularly 
employable "in any well-known branch of the labor market - absent a business boom, the sympathy of 
a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part." Carey v. 
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984). The burden of 
establishing odd-lot status rests upon the claimant. Dumaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 
153, 795 P.2d 312,315 (1990). A claimant may satisfy his or her burden of proof and establish total 
pennanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine in any one of three ways: 
(1.) By showing that he or she has attempted other types of employment without success; 
(2.) By showing that he or she or vocational counselors or employment agencies on his or her behalf 
have searched for other work and other work is not available; or 
(3.) By showing that any efforts to find suitable work would be futile. 
Lethrud v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 ldaho 560,563,887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995). 
36. In the present case, since his industrial accident, Claimant has unsuccessfully attempted other 
work as a taxi driver. Passengers' perfumes and other odors aggravated his COPD. He was forced to 
quit after two days. This single failed work attempt alone is not sufficient to satisfy his burden of 
proof under Lethrud. However, Claimant and others on his behalf have unsuccessfully searched for 
work. Commission consultant Sarah Brown assisted Claimant in an unsuccessful work search. 
Furthermore, vocational expert Teny Montague testified for Claimant and opined that he is totally 
and permanently disabled. Montague testified that Claimant is not likely to be employed regularly in 
any well-known branch of the relevant labor market. 
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37. The Referee finds that Claimant has established a prima facie case that he is an odd-lot worker, 
totally and permanently disabled, under the Lethrud test 
38. Once a claimant establishes a prima facie odd-lot case, the burden shifts to the ISIP to show there 
IS: 
An actual job within a reasonable distance from [claimant's} home which [claimant} is able to 
perform or for which [claimant] can be trained. In addition, the Fund must show that appellant has 
a reasonable opportunity to be employed at that job. It is ofno significance that there is a job 
[claimant] is capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due to his 
injuries, lack of education, lack CJ[ training, or other reasons. 
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403,407,565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1977). 
39. ISIP asserts that Brown believed there were jobs that Claimant could perform. Brown perfo1med 
a labor market survey upon closing Claimant's file and listed several potential jobs including manager 
trainee, bus driver, claims representative service trainee, truck driver, forklift operator, personal home 
care aide, libra1y clerk, substitute teacher, food store retail, and evening desk clerk, Montague 
specifically examined the jobs listed and testified they were at least light duty positions and 
incompatible with Claimant's physical restrictions and transferable skills. Montague's opinion is 
thorough and persuasive. 
40, ISIP also contends that cognitive testing establishes that Claimant is capable of competing in 
college level retraining and thus should not be considered totally permanently disabled. Montague 
persuasively opined, based upon the medical evidence, that although Claimant is cognitively capable 
of college level retraining, his physical limitations -- especially arising from COPD -- make 
successful retraining followed by employment doubtful. 
4 I, The Referee finds that ISIF has not rebutted Claimant's showing that he is an odd-lot worker by 
proving there is an actual job within the relevant labor market which Claimant is able to perform, for 
which he would be considered, and in which he has a reasonable opportunity to be employed. 
Claimant has proven he is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. 
42. ISIF Liability. Idaho Code§ 72-332(1) provides in pertinent part that ifan employee who has a 
permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by injury 
arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, and by reason of the combined effects of 
both the preexisting impairment and the subsequent injury suffers total and permanent disability, the 
employer and its surety will be liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability 
caused by the injmy, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his or her 
income benefits out of the ISIF account. 
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43. Idaho Code§ 72-332(2) further provides that "permanent physical impairment" is as defined in 
Idaho Code § 72-422, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a 
permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to 
constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining re-employment if the 
claimant should become unemployed. This shall be interpreted subjectively as to the particular 
employee involved, however, the mere fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent 
injury shall not create a presumption that the preexisting physical impairment was not of such 
seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment. 
44. In Dumaw v. J. L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990), the Idaho Supreme 
Court listed four requirements a claimant must meet to establish ISIF liability under Idaho Code § 72-
332: 
( 1) Whether there was indeed a preexisting impairment; 
(2) Whether that impairment was manifest; 
(3) Whether the alleged impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and 
(4) Whether the alleged impainnent in any way combines with the subsequent injury to cause total 
disability. 
Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155,795 P.2d at 317. 
45. The preexisting physical impai1ments at issue here are Claimant's right knee, left hand, COPD, 
and the condition of his lumbar and cervical spine prior to his 2005 industrial accident. 
His right knee impainnent was rated by 1996. His left hand impainnent was also rated by 1996. His 
COPD was diagnosed in 2002. His pre-2005 lumbar and cervical spine impairment was established 
by Dr. Robe1is. Each of these conditions preexisted, and was manifest prior to, his 2005 industrial 
accident. The first and second prongs of the Dumaw test have been met. 
46. Claimant asserts, and Defendant contests, that his preexisting conditions were a significant 
hindrance to his employability. Claimant testified that his right knee patellar fracture resulted in 
chronic right knee soreness. Physical therapist's notes document some gait limitations due to his right 
knee condition. However, permanent restrictions due to this condition are Jacking, and the impact 
Claimant's right Jmee condition had on his employability is unclear. 
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47. Claimant testified that his left hand numbness caused him to drop tools, and also prevented him 
from teaching or playing the guitar well. His COPD precluded his employment in areas with 
exposure to strong vapors, caused him to fatigue more readily, and miss work due to frequent 
respiratory illness. His preexisting lumbar and cervical spine symptoms compelled him to transfer 
out of the very strenuous jackhammer work at the water department to the city zoo. 
48. The Referee finds that Claimant's preexisting left hand, COPD, and lumbar and cervical 
conditions constituted hindrances to his employment. The third prong of the Dumaw test is met as to 
these conditions. 
49. Finally, to satisfy the "combines" element, the test is whether, but for the industrial injury, the 
worker would have been totally and pennanently disabled immediately following the oceurrence of 
that injury. This test "encompasses both the combination scenario where each element contributes to 
the total disability, and the case where the subsequent injury accelerates and aggravates the 
preexisting impairment." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921 
P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). 
50. The record contains no persuasive evidence that Claimant's right knee condition combined with 
his 2005 industrial injury to render him totally and pe1manently disabled. It appears the impact of the 
2005 injury eclipsed the effects of his right knee condition. However, there is persuasive evidence 
that the 2005 accident combined with Claimant's preexisting left hand, COPD, lumbar and cervical 
conditions to result in total permanent disability. As noted, Claimant's 2005 injury has restricted him 
to sedentary employment. With numbness in three of five digits, Claimant's left hand condition 
makes it difficult for him to type well, significantly improve his computer literacy, or perform many 
bilateral functions. It precludes him from teaching or playing the guitar well. These limitations 
render Claimant uncompetitive for a number of sedentary positions. Claimant's COPD further 
precludes him from sedentary jobs requiring extensive speaking or subjecting him to paint, perfumes, 
fresh asphalt, or other strongly aromatic compounds. His COPD also causes him to fatigue easily and 
renders him more vulnerable to respiratory illness and resulting in work absences. His COPD clearly 
thwarted his attempts at employment as a taxi driver and telemarketer. Claimant's preexisting lumbar 
and cervical condition reduced his capacity for heavy work. As previously noted, Dr. Roberts 
apportioned 50% of Claimant's lumbar and cervical spine impairment rating to preexisting conditions. 
Dr. Roberts similarly opined that 50% of Claimant's permanent restrictions and limitations pertaining 
to his lumbar and cervical spine condition are due to his preexisting symptomatic conditions. 
Claimant's preexisting lumbar and cervical conditions combine with his 2005 injury to produce the 
extensive physical limitations quantified by Dr. Roberts. 
51. The final prong of the Dumaw test has been satisfied as to Claimant's preexisting left hand, 
COPD, lumbar and cervical conditions. The Referee concludes Claimant has proven ISIF's liability 
under Idaho Code§ 72-332 for his preexisting left hand, COPD, lumbar and cervical conditions. 
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52. Carey Apportionment. The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a formula dividing liability 
between ISIF and the employer/surety at the time of the industrial accident in question. The fonnula 
provides for the apportionment of nonmedical factors by determining the proportion of the 
nonmedical portion of disability between ISIF and the employer/surety by the proportion which the 
preexisting physical impairment bears to the additional impairment resulting from the industrial 
accident. Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, I 07 Idaho 109, 118, 686 P.2d 54, 63 (1984). 
Conditions arising after the injury, but prior to a disability determination, which are not work-related, 
are not the obligation ofISIF. Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912,915, 772P.2d119, 
122 (1989). 
53. Before applying the formula, however, it must be determined which portion of Claimant's 
impairment preexisted the industrial accident, and what portion was caused by the industrial injury. 
As previously noted, Dr. Roberts rated the permanent impairment of Claimant's lumbar and cervical 
spine at 10% of the whole person, attributing 50% to Claimant's 2005 industrial injury and the 
balance to his preexisting condition. Thus, 5% of Claimant's lumbar and cervical impairment 
preexisted his 2005 industrial accident. As noted above, the record further establishes preexisting 
impaim1ents of33% for Claimant's COPD and 3% for Claimant's left hand condition. Claimant's 
qualifying preexisting impairments thus total 41 % of the whole person. 
54. By application of the Carey fonnula ISIF is responsible for the preexisting medical portion of 
41 % impairment and for 4 l/48ths, or 85.42%, of the nonmedical portion of Claimant's permanent 
disability. Thus, ISIF is responsible for payment of full statutory benefits commencing 72.9 weeks 
after November 17, 2005, the date Dr. Roberts found Claimant medically stable. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant has proven he suffers permanent impairment of 48% of the whole person, including 5% 
due to his 2005 industrial accident, 5% due to his preexisting lumbar and cervical impairment, 2% 
due to his right knee fracture, 3% due to his left hand condition, and 33% due to his COPD. Claimant 
has failed to prove he is 100% disabled, however, Claimant has proven that he is an odd-lot worker, 
totally and pennanently disabled, under the Lethrud test. 
2. Defendant ISIF is liable to Claimant under Idaho Code§ 72-332 as to Claimant's preexisting left 
hand, COPD, lumbar and cervical conditions. 
3. Apportionment under the formula set forth in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, !07 
Idaho 109, 686 P .2d 54 ( 1984), is appropriate as follows: ISIF is responsible for payment of full 
statutory benefits commencing 72.9 weeks after November 17, 2005, the date Claimant was 
medically stable. 
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The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law as its own, and issue an appropriate final order. 
***** 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-717, Referee Alan Reed Taylor submitted the the above-entitled matter, 
together with his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the members of the Industrial 
Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and 
the recommendations of the Referee. The Commission concurs with these recommendations. 
Therefore, the Commission approves, confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant has proven he suffers permanent impairment of 48% of the whole person, including 5% 
due to his 2005 industrial accident, 5% due to his preexisting lumbar and cervical impairment, 2% 
due to his right knee fracture, 3% due to his left hand condition, and 33% due to his COPD. Claimant 
has failed to prove he is 100% disabled, however Claimant has proven that he is an odd-lot worker, 
totally and permanently disabled, under the Lethrud test. 
2. Defendant ISIP is liable to Claimant under Idaho Code § 72-332 as to Claimant's preexisting left 
hand, COPD, lumbar and cervical conditions. 
3. Apportionment under the formula set forth in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 
Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), is appropriate as follows: ISIF is responsible for payment of full 
statutory benefits commencing 72.9 weeks after November 17, 2005, the date Claimant was 
medically stable. 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all issues adjudicated. 
DATED this 21st dayofJune, 2007. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl James F. Kile, Chainnan 
Isl R. D. Maynard, Commissioner 
Isl Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner 
CODED AGE: 51 
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It has come to the attention of the Commissioners that the Referee has entered an interlocutory order 
in this matter. [Compiler's Note: See Referee's Order of December 20, 1993, printed immediately 
following this Supplemental Order.] The Commission first wishes to affirm the authority of Referees 
to issue such interlocutory orders. The effect of the order is to provide for dismissal of one defendant 
without prejudice as to claimant's claim against the other defendant. 
In this case, claimant alleged total and permanent disability against the Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund (ISIF) in a separate complaint after it was clear that the employer and surety's primary defense 
was a preexisting condition. Claimant subsequently settled his case with the employer and surety 
prior to the hearing. Claimant made some significant admissions in responding to pretrial discovery 
propounded by ISIF. Claimant then elected not to pursue full adjudication of his rights regarding the 
ISIF. 
In the recent cases of Red Lion v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 122 Idaho 464 (1991) and Tagg 
v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95 (1993) the Idaho Supreme Court made it 
utterly clear that a claimant is free to settle with an employer and surety, dismissing the claim against 
the employer and surety with prejudice, and still be allowed to proceed independently against the 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. We believe that it is especially important to foster the 
environment for settlement in allowing a claimant to settle with one defendant without penalty for not 
settling with the other. In the absence of either express provision of a period of a limitation within 
which a claim must be filed against ISIF, or in the absence of a statutory remedy requiring dismissal 
of!SIF with prejudice following dismissal with prejudice of the employer and surety, the 
Commission declines to create a remedy for the ISIF which the legislature had not envisioned in the 
statute. 
The ISIF has argued that without a disposition with prejudice, our order lacks finality. Had the 
legislature intended for dispositive periods of limitation or similar tYPes of response or bar, then 
somewhere, within the confines of Idaho Code, Sections 72-323 through 72-333, there would have 
been an express inclusion by reference of the periods of limitation contained in Idaho Code, Sections 
72-701, 72-706 and 72-439. However, none of those periods oflimitation are made expressly 
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available to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. Rather, those periods oflimitation are made 
available only to employers and, by definition, to their sureties, so far as it is applicable. Cases under 
prior law are also consistent with this position. In Anderson v. Potlatch Forests, 77 Idaho 263, 268, 
291 P.2d 859 (1955), the Supreme Court, construing comparable language in a prior statute, held that 
no period of limitations applies to claims against ISIF. 
The concept of continuing liability against ISIF is also enhanced by Idaho Code, Section 72-719 
which could, arguably, implicate the liability of ISIF due to a changed condition. In a case such as 
the case at hand where the alleged preexisting condition involves mental infirmities, this possibility is 
less remote than in cases where maximum medical stability is reached, the claimant has been 
successfully working for a convincing period of time, admitted that he or she feels fine, and it would 
be virtually impossible or at least highly improbable for the claimant to return to the hearing process 
claiming that he or she suffered from additional injuries due to a changed condition. 
Notwithstanding, the burden is inherently extremely high to the claimant in this case where the 
claimant may wish to later implead or name ISIF as a defendant in a subsequent complaint. 
We are mindful here that claimant's changed posture regarding total permanent disability occurred 
after settlement of his claim with the surety. This is not unusual; evaluation of the risk of litigation 
changes upon settlement. ISIF asserts that its efforts are all for naught and unfairly so. We disagree. 
With the surety's settlement in place, ISIF's exposure is now more finite and more limited. Its 
exposure has been reduced as a result of the settlement. The same would be true if ISIF were to settle 
with the claimant before the surety. After settlement, the risk of multiple hearings is gone and the 
evaluation of the risk of bringing the ease to hearing as opposed to the costs involved changes. 
Because a settlement is not an actual admission of liability or disability on the part of either the surety 
or the claimant, a decision not to pursue a claim against ISIF is not indicative of an initially frivolous 
case. It is merely a tactical decision from a practical point of view. To regard this tact differently 
would put a chill on the claimant's right to resolve his claim against ISIF at the same time as against 
the surety when the surety's defense is one of a preexisting condition. 
We also note that there is no statutory authority for awarding attorneys fees in this case. Claimant 
alleged impainnent and disability and employer defended by alleging a preexisting condition as the 
cause. There is no evidence that claimant's claim of total and pennanent disability was frivolous at 
the time that he filed his complaint against ISIF. 
We caution against the perception that an affirmative defense alleging that a claimant's condition is 
caused by a preexisting condition requires the filing of a complaint against ISIF. In most cases, this is 
only a signal that apportionment under Idaho Code, Section 72-406 may be appropriate. We think the 
better practice would be for claimant's counsel to, rather than precipitously implead in the ISIF, 
pursue his own pretrial discovery against the employer and surety and dete1mine the depth and 
sufficiency of this defense. Claimant must balance the need for adequate investigation as well as 
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the need for early notification to ISIF if claimant is to pursue a claim in a timely fashion which would 
include giving ISIF early notice so that it has time to defend the claim while still allowing the 
claimant speedy relief. There is an inherent conflict here between the claimant's right to a speedy 
resolution of his or her case and the ISIF's need to prepare its case. This conflict would impede 
claimant's avenue to relief if claimant had to wait to file against ISIF until discovery is completed 
and/or claimant is stable, fearing that if claimant later dismissed ISIF he or she would incur costs or 
prejudice. 
As a practical matter, dismissal without prejudice in this case will operate in the same mam1er as 
dismissal with prejudice, since claimant has an almost impossible burden to bear in raising any issues 
against ISIF in the future. The Commission declines to issue any monetary award that operates as a 
punitive measure that inhibits a claimant's attempt to obtain a timely resolution of his or her case. 
Further, we find and conclude, based on claimant's voluntary dismissal against ISIF, that claimant, as 
of the date of the hearing, is not totally and permanently disabled. 
Having so found, claimant's motion to voluntarily dismiss his complaint should be granted. 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, the Commission enters this Supplemental Order to affirm 
the Referee's Order dated and filed on December 20, 1993. 
DA TED and FILED at Boise, Idaho, this 4th day of May, 1994. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl Herb Carlson 
Isl Stephen J. Lord 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
A Telephone PreHearing Conference was held in the above captioned action on December 20, 1993 
at 2:00 p.m.
1 
The issue heard were claimant's motion to dismiss his complaint against ISIF without 
prejudice and the Motion ofISIF for attorneys fees for the filing of a frivolous claim. 
At hearing the Referee indicated that she was considering a dismissal with prejudice and a denial of 
attorney fees, but wished to take the matter under advisement. 
The hearing was set for 3:00 p.m. but due to an error on the part of the AT&T operator, was held at 2:00 p.m. with the 
consent of the parties. 
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The Referee has carefully reviewed the parties' motions, memoranda, and the file. The Referee does 
not find that the claimant has filed a frivolous claim and therefore denies the motion for attorney fees. 
The Referee has carefully reviewed Idaho Code, Section 72-332 and considered the purpose of the 
Workers' Compensation Law of the State of Idaho. There being no statute of limitations on claims 
filed against ISIF, the Referee does not find that a dismissal without prejudice would put ISIF in any 
different situation than it has already been placed under the statute. Any claim filed against ISIF 
must have validity and each claim will be separately scrutinized to prevent abuse of the ability to file 
a claim against ISIF. In this case, the Referee has not found such abuse. However, this does not 
mean that claimant can freely file claims in the future without liability if those claims are frivolous. 
Claimant's motion to dismiss without prejudice is granted. No attorney fees are assessed. 
DATED and FILED at Boise, Idaho, this 20th day of December, 1993. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl Amy S. Howe 
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The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Industrial Commission, November 14, 1990. 
Commissioners Gerald A. Geddes and Logan E. Lanham and Chairman Will S. Defenbach heard the matter. 
Claimant was present in person and represented by James F. Combo, of the firm of Goicoechea Law Offices 
of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund was represented by Starr Kelso, of the 
firm of Sims, Liesche, Newell, Kelso & Cartwright, Wallace and Wallace of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Oral and 
documentary evidence were presented and the matter was continued for the submission of other evidence in 
the form of oral deposition. The deposition of William L. Mauk was subsequently filed with the Commission 
and is hereby incorporated into the record. Counsel for the parties then submitted briefs and the matter is now 
ready for a decision. 
ISSUES 
The issues presented for resolution at the hearing were as follows: 
1. Whether the Claimant's claim against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is precluded by the previous 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement entered into between the Claimant and the Employer/Surety; 
2. Whether the Claimant's claim against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is barred under the doctrine 
oflaches; 
3. Whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled by the combined effects of preexisting 
impairments and the subsequent industrial accident; and, 
4. If the Claimant is found to be totally and permanently disabled, how shall the liability for his disability be 
apportioned. 
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1. Hearing testimony of Lloyd E. Tagg, Claimant; 
2. Hearing testimony of Tom L. Moreland, Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist; 
3. Hearing testimony of Steven R. Hamman, Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant; 
4. Deposition of William L. Mauk taken November 15, 1990; 
5. Exhibits I - 11 admitted at the hearing. 
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After having fully considered all of the above evidence and the arguments of Counsel, we the Commission 
submit the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Award in this case. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I 
On December 7, 1985, Claimant suffered an industrial accident and injury. At that time Claimant was a 57-
year old married male with no children under the age of eighteen dependent upon him for support. Claimant 
filed a Notice ofinjury and Claim for Benefits with the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho on 
December 18, l 985. 
II 
Res Judicata 
The first issue to be addressed in this case is whether the Claimant's claim against the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund !hereinafter referenced to as "ISIF") is precluded by the previous Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement entered into between the Claimant and his Employer/Surety. 
On December 7, 1985 Claimant injured his lower back while working as a long-haul truck driver. The 
Claimant subsequently entered into a settlement in that case on July 15, 1987, by a document entitled 
"Stipulation And Agreement Of Lump Sum Discharge And Order Of Approval And Discharge" with his 
Employer, P.I.E. Nationwide, Incorporated, and the Surety, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The 
Industrial Commission approved this settlement document by attached Order on July 20, I 987. 
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In the document, the Claimant acknowledges that the parties in effect reached a settlement concerning the 
Claimant's industrial accident and injury which occurred on December 7, 1985. Claimant and the Employer's 
attorney, acting as agent, signed the agreement immediately following the final clause of the agreement. The 
final clause states: 
It is understood that in executing this agreement these proceedings are concluded and forever closed 
by reason thereof, subject only to Commission approval and Order, and that Claimant will not 
thereqfier be able to reopen the same for any purpose. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Claimant and 
Defendants hereby petition the Industrial Commission for a lump sum settlement as evidenced by these 
presents. 
In the present case the Claimant is not adjudicating matters with a party to the settlement agreement. Rather 
this present hearing concerns a different defendant, the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. The parties do not 
dispute the finality of that judgment as to the Claimant, Employer and Surety. That matter is adjudged. The 
stipulation and agreement of Lump Sum Settlement was entered into between the Claimant and the 
Employer/Surety. The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund was not a party. The Order of the Industrial 
Commission itself only dismissed with prejudice the Claimant's proceeding against PIE Nationwide, 
Incorporated and Liberty Mutnal Fire Insurance Company. Nowhere in that Lump Sum Agreement was the 
IS!F dismissed. 
Idaho Code§ 72-332(1) makes clear that the IS!F is liable when an employee's preexisting impairment 
combines with a work related injury rendering the employee permanently and totally disabled. 
The Idaho Supreme court in Davidson v. H. H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986) held that the 
Commission's approval of a lump sum worker's compensation settlement agreement is a final decision of the 
Commission. See Idaho Code§ 72-311. Compensation agreements. Idaho Code§ 72-718 provides the 
following in part: 
72-7 I 8, Finality of Commission's decision. A decision of the Commission,. . shall be final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission. 
Therefore only matters adjudicated by the Commission are final and conclusive and would then have a 
preclusive effect. 
Two questions must be answered. First, has the total and pe,manent disability claim been adjudicated by the 
Commission in approving the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement in 1987? And, second has the alleged liability 
of!S!F been adjudicated by the Commission in approving the Lnmp Sum Settlement Agreement in 1987? 
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In Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 401 (1988) the Supreme court held in a case 
where the ISIF was a party, 
A compensation agreement is res judicata only with respect to matters already decided by that 
agreement. Since the compensation agreement between Kindred and Amalgamated did not determine 
the retraining benefits, it cannot be considered as adjudicated with respect to any new awards, as I. C. 
§ 72-718 distinctly provides: "A decision of the Commission . .. shall be final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated. .. [cites omitted}. 
Neither Claimant's total and permanent disability nor the liability of the ISIF were agreed upon in the Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement language refers only to the Claimant and 
the Employer/Surety and never to the ISIF. Furthermore, the language omits any discussion of total and 
permanent disability. 
Directly on point is the Supreme Court decision in Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,644 P.2d 331 (1982). In Sines 
v. Appel, the claimant injured his back in an industrial accident. Claimant's physical condition was also 
impaired by the preexisting disease of multiple sclerosis. The claimant, employer and the surety entered into a 
compensation agreement and settlement which was subsequently approved by the Industrial Commission. 
Later, the claimant moved to amend the award approved by the Commission and joined the ISIF because the 
claimant alleged he was totally and permanently disabled. The Idaho Supreme Court held in part that: 
"Initially, under the foregoing finality rule, a question arises as to the effect of I. C. § 72-711 on the 
facts presented here. Reiterating the situation we are dealing with, the claimant and the employer's 
surety entered into a compensation agreement which was approved by the Industrial Commission. At 
that time, ISIF was not a party to the agreement. . . The Commission on the basis of the agreement 
approved the award. . . with no consideration given as to whether or not ISIF should be made a 
party. Under this state of facts, only the employee and the employer and his surety could rely upon the 
finality of that award under Idaho Code§ 72-711 and 72-718. Resjudicata is applicable only to the 
parties to that proceeding and their privies. {cites omitted}. 
Applying the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Sines to the facts of this case, it is clear that the only parties 
that are entitled to resjudicata and the finality of the Commission's approval of the 1987 Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement b~tween Claimant, Employer and Employer's Surety are these specific parties. The 
Defendant in the present case was not party to that proceeding, nor was the issue of Claimant's total and 
permanent disability addressed. The ISIF cannot claim that approval of the compensation agreement 
foreclosed proceedings against it. 
We therefore find and conclnde that the Claimant has prevailed on this issue, and is not precluded 
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from seeking permanent disability benefits from the Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund in this case. 
III 
Laches 
The second issue before the Commission is whether the claim against the ISIP is barred under the doctrine of 
!aches. The doctrine of !aches arises out of equity and therefore the Commission must weigh the relative 
conduct of both parties in light of the facts and circumstances present. 
The ISIP is asking the Commission to create in effect a statute of limitations by finding a !aches defense. The 
legislature, in its wisdom, has not however created such a time bar. Furthermore, since the time duration 
between the date of the accident on December 7, 1985 and the date Claimant filed for application for a 
hearing against the ISIP on February 6, 1989, is less than the statute of limitation imposed by Idaho Code§ 72-
706 in favor of employers, a finding of a !aches defense would impose a time bar more restrictive than that 
afforded the employer. Such a result would be contrary to the purpose of both the workers' compensation law 
and the ISIP. 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court in Huppert v. Wolford, 91 Idaho 249 at 257, 420 P.2d 11 at 19 (1966) 
to invoke the defense of !aches, Idaho requires the following elements to be proven: 
(!) Defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, 
(2) Delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice and opportunity to institute suit, 
(3) Lack of knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and 
( 4) hljury or prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred. 
Lapse ohime, although an impo1tant element, is not alone controlling in determining the applicability of the 
defense of !aches, unless the party claiming !aches was injured or placed at disadvantage by such delay. 
The Idaho Supreme Comt applied this test in a recent workers' compensation case, Brooks v. Standard Fire 
hlsuranceCo., 117Idaho 1066at 1071, 793 P.2d 1238 at 1243 (1990)andstated: 
One who has unreasonably delayed in the pursuit of an action to the pr~judice or detriment of the 
other will be denied equitable relief 
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Thus, for ISIF to prevail it must show that the Claimant unreasonably delayed in asserting his rights and that 
he had notice and opportunity to institute his claim against the so-called second injury fund. 
Claimant filed for hearing against the ISIF within the statutory time bar running in favor of the Employer. 
ISIF's liability only arises once the employer's liability is determined and the claimant is found totally and 
pennanently disabled. Clearly an unreasonable delay must, in the first instance, be a delay that exceeds the 
duration in which claimants can bring suit against their employer. The present case is not a situation where 
fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years have passed since the injury, and evidentiary and proof problems may 
exist. Rather, it is a case where the Claimant's medical and physical condition, his educational and intellectual 
abilities and the labor market have changed negligibly between the time of the injury to the present. Though 
Claimant has grown older, any difference in his employability as a fifty-eight, sixty or sixty-two year old pales 
compared to all the rest of the circumstances in the record. Therefore, the Commission finds that Claimant's 
delay in bringing claim against the ISIF was not unreasonable. 
Claimant has a limited education having completed only the ninth grade. Furthermore, Claimant did not retain 
counsel for his workers' compensation claim against his Employer and the Surety, nor for the resulting 
settlement agreement. 
At the hearing, Claimant testified that he entered into the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at the advice of 
the rehabilitation consultant for the State of Idaho's Industrial Commission. Specifically, the Claimant 
testified that the consultant had told him that the offer that had been made by the Surety was all the money he 
was entitled to under the law. Claimant's reliance on the representation of the state employee rather than 
counsel and his limited education leads this Commission to conclude that Claimant did not have notice or 
opportunity to institute suit. Furthermore, Defendants failed to put forth any evidence, and none was found in 
the record indicating Claimant unreasonably delayed or knew of the second injury fund or knew of his rights 
under Idaho Code§ 72-332. 
The Commission finds and concludes that the Defendant failed to prove the [aches defense and that the 
Claimant has prevailed on this issue. Therefore, he is not barred from bringing his claim against the ISIF 
under Idaho Code§ 72-332. 
IV 
Odd-Lot Worker 
The third issue before the Commission is whether Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the "odd-
lot" doctrine. According to testimony, evidence and arguments of counsel, Claimant's occupation over a span 
of forty years has been as a long-haul l!uck driver. On December 7, 1985 Claimant experienced sharp and 
severe pain in his low-back while attempting to lift a converter gear 
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into place to hook up a trailer. Shortly thereafter, while continuing his haul he contacted his Employer and 
reported the injury. 
The medical evidence is uncontroverted. Claimant sustained an acute physical injury to his low-back which 
has been related to his industrial accident of December 7, 1985. The Spokane Panel gave Claimant a ten 
percent (I 0%) whole person impairment rating which was affirmed by the Industrial Commission in the 
stipulation for Lump Snm Settlement. Defendant admits the occurrence of the accident on December 7, 1985, 
the causal relationship and the impairment often percent (10%) of the whole person as rated by the Spokane 
Panel. 
Claimant argues that he is an "odd-lot" worker and is therefore permanently and totally disabled, entitling him 
to compensation from ISIF under Idaho Code§ 72-332. An individual is considered to be an "odd-lot" worker 
when he is so handicapped that he could not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor 
market, absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a 
super-human effort on his part. Lyons v. Industrial Special Indenmity Fund, 98 Idaho 403,565 P.2d 1360 
(1977). Unlike the case in Lyons, here the evidence of claimant's employability is in dispute. Therefore, 
claimant's burden of proof in attempting to establish a primafacie case of odd-lot doctrine is to prove the 
unavailability of suitable work. Gordon v. West, 103 Idaho 100,645 P.2d 334 (1982). 
The recent case of Huerta v. School District. #431. et.al., I 16 Idaho 43, 773 P.2d 1130 (1989) identifies the 
type of evidence necessary to establish a primafacie case that the claimant falls within the "odd-lot" 
category. It is necessary for the claimant to do more than assert that he cannot perform his previous type of 
employment. He may prove the unavailability of suitable work by: 
I) Showing what other types of employment employee has attempted; or 
2) Showing that the employee, or vocational counselors, employment agencies, or the Job Service on behalf 
of the employee, have searched for other work for the employee, and that other work was not available; or 
3) any efforts of the employee to find suitable employment would have been futile. 116 Idaho at 48-49, 773 
P.2d at l 135-36. 
By proving the unavailability of suitable work by one of the above three methods, claimant will meet his 
burden and prove aprimafacie case of"odd-lot" status. Then the burden shifts to the defendants to show 
that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to claimant. Lyons, supra. 
Claimant's doctors indicated that he would not be able to return to work as a !tuck driver inasmuch 
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as he would not be able to withstand extended periods of sitting. Claimant asked his employer continuously 
and regularly about dispatcher work or other sedentary/ light duty work. A job did not materialize. Claimant, 
without success, contacted the employment office in Kellogg one to three times per week, screening the books 
looking for work in the Silver Valley. Claimant registered at the Department of Employment, State ofldaho, 
and was in contact weekly. The only lead he received from the Department of Employment was as a 
salesman of business machines which required heavy lifting. The consultant from the Industrial Commission 
Rehabilitation Division helped the Claimant in his job search, but was also unable to identify a position. 
Finally, the Claimant contacted the Idaho Department of Vocational Rehabilitation a couple of times but was 
unable to find work. Claimant has met his burden and proved the unavailability of suitable work. Claimant 
showed that he and others have searched for "other work" and that "other work" was not available. The 
second method in Huerta is met. 
Claimant also meets his burden under the futility test. Claimant has chronic pain resulting from the many 
accidents, injuries and illness he has suffered. He has had triple coronaiy by-pass surgery, five major 
operations on his back and neck, loss of hearing, as well as symptoms remaining from the rheumatic fever he 
suffered while in the Navy. He is limited in his movements. Claimant cannot sit or stand for more than thirty 
minutes at a time, and cannot walk more than one hundred feet without needing a rest. Claimant's recovery 
from the industrial accident of December 7, 1985 was poor. The surgery only temporarily caused the pain to 
subside. On her initial chart notes, Dr. Moise noted that the Claimant experienced severe pain in riding in a 
car as a passenger or driver. She noted that he was only able to sit five to fifteen minutes at a time, stand 
only thirty minutes at a time, and walk only about one hundred feet. She noted that he appeared to have a 
significant amount of persistent pain in his back with marked limitations of motion due to pain. Dr. Moise 
prescribed physical therapy but the pain worsened, so the therapy was discontinned. 
Claimant testified as to his condition after the accident. He said his physical activities were significantly 
reduced. Claimant indicated that he could not twist, turn or walk because of the pain and swelling in his legs 
and numbness in his fingers. He could only stand comfortably for fifteen minutes at a time. Likewise, fifteen 
minutes was about as long as he could tolerate sitting. At the time he was released from care by Dr. Moise 
he indicated he did not feel capable of driving more than ten to fifteen miles on a daily basis. 
Claimant was sixty-two years old at the time of this hearing. He has been employed as a long-haul truck 
driver his entire adult life. Claimant's attending physicians agree that he should not, and cannot, return to 
work as a truck driver. Claimant has a ninth grade education. He scored low on the GAT aptitude test 
indicating below general aptitude ability in verbal, numerical and clerical skills. He also scored low in motor 
coordination, finger dexterity and manual dexterity. The medical records indicate Claimant is confined to 
sedentaiy or limited light-duty work, yet there is a lack of this kind of work available in the Silver Valley area, 
and Claimant is not able to travel. Claimant's unreliable 
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physical and medical condition either renders him unable to work regularly and steadily or he will be 
perceived to be such a risk by potential employers. Based on Claimant's medical and nonmedical factors, and 
the evidence presented in this case, the Commission is persuaded that the Claimant has established that it 
would be futile for him to attempt to seek employment. 
The Claimant has proved the unavailability of suitable work under two separate and independent Huerta, 
supra methods. Therefore, we the Commission find that the Claimant has met his burden of proving that he is 
an "odd-lot" worker. 
Defendants argue that actual jobs exist for Claimant, that he is employable and he is not an "odd-lot" worker. 
The burden on the Defendant is to show there is an actual job within a reasonable distance which is readily 
and continuously available to the Claimant and which he has a reasonable opportunity to obtain. Lyons, 
supra; Francis v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 98 Idaho 407,565 P.2d 1364 (1977); and Reifsteck v. Lantern 
Motel & Cafe, 101 Idaho 669,619 P.2d 1152 (1980). 
According to the Supreme Court Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 769 P.2d 572 (1989): 
". . . a worker who sustains an industrial accident is not required to move from his or her home to 
find suitable work in order to be eligible for worker's compensation. Rather, the worker must seek 
work only a reasonable distance from his or her home. Professor Larson in his treatise on worker's 
compensation, writes: 
The test ofreasonableness does not require the claimant to look for work beyond the general area in 
which he lives. 
2A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,§ 57.61 (cl), at 245 (1985); 115 Idaho at 697. 
Defendants rely on statistics generated by Mr. Hamman, their witness, who is a vocational rehabilitation 
consultant. Mr. Hamman identified fifty-seven supposed sedentary and light-duty job openings in the Coeur 
d'Alene labor market during part of 1990 that he believed were suitable and available for the Claimant. From 
this he opined that a stable labor market existed for the Claimant. We give little weight to this evidence. It is 
too speculative. First, the information cannot be relied on to give an adequate picture of the job market in any 
year. Second, according to Mr. Hamman's testimony approximately twenty of the alleged jobs were duplicate 
offerings by singular employers. Third, Mr. Hamman identified no specific jobs whatsoever, meeting the 
requirements Mr. Hamman, himself had opined to be suitable for the Claimant. Fourth, Mr. Hamman made 
no effort to contact any specific employer regarding the Claimant. Fifth, twenty of thirty-seven jobs Mr. 
Hamman originally presented to opposing Counsel as suitable and available required a high school degree or 
its equivalent. The Claimant has a ninth grade education. Sixth, Mr. Hamman had not met, interviewed, 
questioned or seen the Claimant in person. 
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We find no credible evidence put forth by Defendants in attempting to prove that some kind of suitable work is 
regularly and continuously available to Claimant in the Coeur d'Alene labor market. Furthermore, they put no 
evidence on as to positions available in the Silver Valley area. 
Even if Defendants had shown suitable work in Coeur d'Alene there is ample evidence that commuting to 
Coeur d'Alene is unreasonable for the Claimant. Commuting eigbty to ninety miles daily over mountains, 
given the Claimant's medical and physical problems, is not reasonable. In order for Claimant to reasonably 
work in Coeur d'Alene he would have to move there. According to Combs, supra, moving is not required. 
Based on the evidence presented in this case, we are persuaded that the Defendant has not established that 
any suitable employment is available for the Claimant. Defendants have not met their burden of proof. The 
Commission therefore finds and concludes that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
V 
Preexisting Condition 
The record clearly indicates Claimant has a lifetime history of injuries and medical problems. While serving 
his country in the United States Navy in 1945, Claimant contacted Rheumatic Fever, disabling him and 
causing swollen feet, limbs and legs. These symptoms persist through his adult life. According to testimony, 
Claimant experienced difficulties in movement such as walking and running, jumping and climbing, and in 
nbnmovement such as standing and sitting. 
In the early I 960's Claimant herniated a disc in his neck which required surgery. The surgery was only 
partially successful rendering Claimant's neck stiff and limited in motion. 
In 1970, Claimant had a head-on collision while driving !luck and injured his low-back. He experienced pain 
in his leg, back and arm. Claimant underwent a bilateral hemilaminectomy at LS-SI on March 2, 1971. 
According to his medical records Claimant was off work for approximately one year and then was released to 
return to light-duty work with restrictions to limit his bending, stooping and lifting. Claimant could no longer 
make as long a trip as he had in the past and was required to stop more often along his route. 
In 1974 Claimant sustained an industrial accident injuring his low-back. An anterior cervical discectomy and 
fusion in Claimant's neck at LS-6 and L6-7 were performed. Approximately five months later Claimant 
underwent a laminectomy and fusion at L4-L5-S I. Claimant remained off work for approximately two and 
one-half years. He was given a light-duty release with restriction of 
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fifteen pounds and was advised to avoid any bending or stooping. Claimant's work schedule had to be tapered 
back. 
Bad fortune revisited Claimant in 1978, when he suffered another industrial accident slipping and falling to the 
ground while attempting to get out of his truck. He experienced severe pain in both his neck and shoulders. 
Claimant's doctor diagnosed right tardy ulnar palsy. Once again Claimant underwent surgery. An ulnar nerve 
transfer was performed on December 15, 1978. Claimant lost seven to eight months of work. Once released 
to work, he had a fifteen percent (15%) upper extremity impairment. His work capacity was further reduced 
due to soreness and numbness in his fingers. 
In 1981 Claimant sustained a heart attack and underwent a triple coronary by-pass operation in December of 
that year. Again, Claimant was off work for six to seven months. His cardiologist, issued a thirty to fifty 
percent (30% - 50%) impairment due to chest pains and underlying coronary artery disease. Claimant 
became tired easily and had to slow down further. 
Finally, audiograms taken on Claimant on August 6, 1985, evidenced a combined monaural hearing loss of 
twenty-eight point forty-three percent (28.43%). Claimant continuously hears ringing and has difficulty 
hearing. 
In sunmmry, prior to is accident and injury on December 7, 1985, Claimant had a debilitating preexisting 
condition. He had triple coronary by-pass surgery, four surgeries relating to back, neck and arm pain, loss of 
hearing, and symptoms such as swelling and pain lingering from his Navy days. After each injury, illness, and 
treatment Claimant had more and more difficulties keeping up the pace he once had. His movement 
diminished. His pain increased. Long hauls were interrupted so that Claimant could ease his pain and his trips 
became less frequent. 
VI 
Apportionment 
Since the Claimant has been found to be totally and permanently disabled, the remaining issue to be resolved 
is whether liability for his disability should be apportioned between the Employer/Surety and the ISIF. 
Where a claimant is totally and permanently disabled by the combined effect of both a preexisting impairment 
and subsequent injury, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of compensation benefits for the 
disability caused by the injury, and the employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his compensation 
benefits from the Industrial Special Indenmity Fund. Idaho 
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Code§ 72-332(1), Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9,664 P.2d 331 (1982). Idaho Code§ 72-332(2) further 
provides the following: 
72-332. PAYMENT FOR SECOND INJURIES FROM INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY ACCOUNT 
(2) permanent physical impairment is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho Code, provided, however, as 
used in this section such impairment must be a permanent condition, whether congenital or due to 
injury or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment 
or to obtaining re-employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be interpreted 
subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere fact that a claimant is employed 
at the time of the subsequent injury shall not create a presumption that the preexisting permanent 
physical impairment was not of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to 
obtaining employment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Mapusaga v. Red Lion Inn, 113 Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1985), established a 
two-step analysis to be used to determine whether a condition constitutes a "permanent physical impairment" 
under§ 72-332(2): 
(I) Whether the injured claimant considers the preexisting impairment an obstacle or hindrance to 
further employment and, if so, (2) Whether a reasonable employer under the circumstances would 
consider the claimant's impairment to be of such a nature that any subsequent injury combined with the 
impairment would more likely make the claimant totally and permanently disabled. . If both 
requirements are met, a claimant will be considered to have a 'permanent' physical impairment within 
the meaning of Idaho Code Section 72-332(2). 
The Idaho Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged that this two step process announced in Mapusaga, 
supra, had not correctly interpreted a 1981 amendment to Idaho Code, § 72-332(2), and to that extent, the 
court overruled Mapusaga, supra, in the recent case of Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 786 
P.2d 557 (1990). In Archer, the Court stated the revised application of tbe two-part test previously enunciated 
in Mapusaga. 
Under this test, evidence of the claimant's attitude toward the preexisting condition, the claimant's 
medical condition before and after the injury or disease for which compensation is sought, nonmedical 
factors concerning the claimant, as well as expert opinions and other evidence concerning the effect 
of the preexisting condition on the claimant's employability will all be admissible. No longer will the 
result turn merely on the claimant's attitude toward the condition and expert opinion concerning 
whether a reasonable employer would consider the claimant's condition to make it more likely that any 
subsequent injury would make the claimant totally and permanently disabled. The result now will be 
determined by the Commission's weighing of the evidence presented on the question of whether or not 
the 
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preexisting condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the particular claimant. 
Claimant's preexisting medical condition consisted of Rheumatic fever, five (5) major surgeries, including 
back and neck surgery and a triple coronary by-pass operation, as well as, hearing loss. Claimant suffered 
pain and reduced movement. The medical records clearly indicate the great extent of his preexisting 
impairments. Claimant in effect also testified at the hearing that his back and cardiovascular problems were a 
hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment. 
We find ample evidence in the medical record contraindicating employment as a truck driver. Claimant's 
ability to perform heavy lifting and manual labor had been reduced significantly prior to the accident and 
injury on December 7, 1985. Furthermore, his lack of education, given his age, reduced his opportunities for 
retraining. 
Dr. Siebert's comments in 1980 indicate in effect that Claimant's preexisting conditions were both a hindrance 
and obstacle to obtaining employment. Dr. Siebert restricted Claimant's lifting to approximately fifteen 
pounds, restricted the duration Claimant should stand, and stated that repetitive bending and stooping will not 
be able to be well performed. Dr. Siebert stated that Claimant's general intelligence level would further limit 
the type of jobs for which Claimant might qualify, but that a position as a truck dispatcher might be 
appropriate. Tom Moreland, Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist, testified in effect that Claimant's 
preexisting condition suggested that Claimant should have stayed away from heavy to very heavy work. 
Claimant's testimony states that he was a long-haul truck driver because it required reduced manual labor of 
which he had diminished capacity to perform. Furthermore, Claimant testified that following each of bis 
previous back and neck surgeries, and in particular after his triple coronary by-pass surgery, he was required 
to drive less frequently and drive shorter durations each trip due to his pain. 
According to the medical records of Dr. Judge of Spokane Cardiology on December 2, I 985, Claimant's 
treadmill exercise concluded after only 4.2 minutes. This concluded earlier than the doctor expected, and was 
stopped due to Claimant's shortness of breath and fatigue. In comparison, on January I 4, I 985, Claimant went 
7.3 minutes on the treadmill. This, too, lasted a shorter duration than Dr. Judge expected. Claimant's 
condition worsened and limited him. 
The record indicates Claimant was recuperating anywbere from two and one half years on the one extreme, 
to six to eight months on the other after each surgery. But for his desire to get back to work, those 
recuperation periods would have likely been longer. Claimant in effect masked his limitations. Claimant's 
preexisting medical condition acted as a obstacle and hindrance to his longhaul truck driving job as it certainly 
did to any potential employment in other careers. 
The Commission after having weighed the evidence and considered the record as a whole, concludes there is 
ample evidence to support the conclnsion that Claimant's preexisting condition did constitute a hindrance or 
obstacle to employment for him. 
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Having concluded Claimant's impaiiment was a subjective hindrance to employment, the Commission 
consequently concludes that Claimant does suffer a permanent physical impairment as defined by Idaho Code 
§ 72-332. Therefore, ISIF is liable for Claimant's workers' compensation benefits relating to his total and 
permanent disability. 
The method of apportioning total and permanent disability benefits under Idaho Code§ 72-332, between the 
ISIF and the employer/surety is dictated by Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 
686 P.2d 54 (1984). Application of the Carey formula starts with the fact that the Claimant has a total 
physical impairment rating of ten percent whole person from the accident of December 7, 1985. Claimant's 
preexisting condition was rated at seventy-five percent of whole person by Dr. Blaisdell utilizing the AMA 
Guides. Thus, Claimant's impairment total is seventy-five percent plus ten percent or eighty-five percent of 
the whole person. Subtracting eighty-five percent from one hundred percent equals fifteen percent (15%) of 
the whole person, which is his disability allocable to nonmedical factors. 
The nonmedical factors are apportioned by utilizing the factors 75/85 x 15 or l 3.235, which is allocable to the 
preexisting conditions, and 10/85 x 15 or 1.764, which is allocable to the Employer/Surety. Therefore, the 
Employer's/Surety's total liability is ten percent ( l 0%) plus one point eight ( 1.8) or eleven point eight percent 
(I 1.8%) for fifty-1\ine (59) weeks at one hundred fifty-eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($158.95) per week. 
Dr. Moise of Rehabilitation Associates determined that further treatment as of January 9, 1987 was 
unwarranted. Based on her observations and her release from care, the Commission finds Claimant totally 
and permanently disabled on Januaiy 9, 1987. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332, the Claimant shall be compensated for the remainder of his total and 
permanent disability from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. The ISIF is found to be responsible for the 
payment of income benefits to the Claimant at the appropriate total disability rate, commencing January 10, 
1987, for the remainder of Claimant's lifetime, adjusted annually for increases in the average weekly state 
wage. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
The Claimant, by entering into a prior Lump Sum Agreement with different defendants in an earlier case, is 
not foreclosed from seeking total and pennanent disability benefits in this case. 
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The Claimant, by filing a hearing against the present Defendant more than three years after his accident and 
injury is not barred under the doctrine of !aches from seeking total and permanent disability benefits in this 
case. 
III 
The Claimant has carried his burden and has established that he is an "odd-lot" worker and is therefore 
pe1manently and totally disabled as of January 10, 1987, as a result of his preexisting permanent physical 
impairment of seventy-five percent (75%) of the whole person and as a result of his accident on December 7, 
1985, which resulted in a permanent physical impairment often percent (10%) of the whole person, for a total 
permanent physical impairment rating of eighty-five percent (85%) of the whole person, and for which the 
Claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his total and permanent disability. 
IV 
The Defendant has not carried its burden and has not shown that suitable work is regularly and continuously 
available to the Claimant. 
V 
Claimant has a preexisting permanent physical impairment that constitutes a hindrance or obstacle to 
employment or reemployment. Therefore, his total and permanent disability should be apportioned between 
the Employer/Surety and the ISIF. 
VI 
Claimant is entitled to income benefits from the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund as set forth in the above 
Findings Of Fact. 
VII 
We enter the following award in favor of the Claimant. 
AWARD 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AND THIS DOES ORDER, ADJUDGE 
AND DECREE that Claimant have and recover from Defendant, Industrial Special 
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Indemnity Fund, workers' compensation benefits for total permanent disability in accordance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED AND FILED at Boise, Idaho, this 18th day of March, 1991. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Isl Gerald A. Geddes 
Isl Logan E. Lanham 
CODED AGE: 57 
CODED AGE: 62 
